Bottom 5 Tanks from the Parola Armour Museum

In the second blog about Parola Armour Museum I’ll list my 5 Bottom Tanks from the museum's collection. 

But we start with some basic information about the museum. The Parola Armour Museum (opened 1961) is a specialized war museum of the Finnish Tank Core. The museum preserves the traditions of the WWII era Finnish Panssaridivisioona (Armoured Division) and Jääkäriprikaati (Jäger Brigade). In the Museum there are some 100 exhibits all of whom are not on display. Several tanks in the museum are still roadworthy.

So, You may ask, why these tanks and the museum is worthy of to write about? It goes back to the year of 1944. The Soviets had unleashed their major summer offensive against Finns. Front lines were breached, defensive posts overrun. The Finnish HQ used the Panssaridivisioona and Jääkäriprikaati as a decisive elite force to stop Soviet breakouts and advances. If possible, to push them back in order to regain the lost main defensive lines in Kuuterselkä, Viipuri, Portinhoikka, Tali, Ihantala and Vuosalmi.

WWII era tanks of the museum and the men that used them in their part saved Finland from the Soviet occupation by being the necessary "Fire Brigade" to stabilize the front. However not all of those tanks were of the first class, a far cry from it. In fact some of them were so bad they even couldn't be used in the front line service.

Thus here they are: the bottom ones!

5 Soviet KV-1E Model 1940 Heavy Tank  

KV-1E at Parola 2026 © Historix

Bottom 5 and 4 tanks have a special connection between them: the reason why the KV-1 tank was developed in the first place came from the battle experiences of the Spanish Civil War 1935-1939. There Soviet T-26 light tanks had been the masters of tank combat against Italian CV L3/33-35 tankettes and German PzKpfw I tanks. The entry of a new German anti-tank gun the 3,7 cm Pak 36 (Panzerabwehrkanone) and anti-aircraft gun 8,8 cm Flak 18 (Flugabwehrkanone) changed the situation. Now it became clear for the Soviets something heavier and better armoured has to be manufactured in order to regain initiative and proper armour protection.

KV-1 was designed to meet the challenge: it had to be protected well enough to be immune against 3,7 cm Pak 36 and other modern anti-tank guns. This was achieved by making the armour protection previously unseen heavy. As a rule in order to be successful tank has to find a balance between three factors: protection, firepower and mobility. KV-1 had the protection and also firepower to to some extent, but mobility and reliability became much of an issue. Poor mobility and high weight combined with unreliable transmission and drive train made KV-1 to struggle to keep up with faster and more agile T-34/76. 

Despite the heavy structure of KV-1 it had no firepower advantage over the much lighter T-34/76 as both tanks shared the same F-32/F-34 tank cannon. KV-1 had very poor ergonomics and crew layout with limited visibility. This led to poor overall situational awareness - crews were essentially blind. Last, but not the least, KV-1 was significantly more expensive and slower to produce than the T-34/76.

To summarize; KV-1's heavy armour came at too high a cost in other vital areas. In fact these issues stayed unsolved leading to the cancellation of KV-1 production in 1943. KV-1 was replaced by more balanced designs like the IS series and upgraded T-34s.

Parola museum has the sole surviving KV-1E in the world. It was captured at Solomanni, north of Petrozavodsk, East Karelia, in the autumn of 1941. Finns had captured several KV-1s in various technical conditions but could take into use only two of them, one being this registered as Ps 272-1 and in Finnish use it was named as KV-1B. 

Finnish troops gave it a nickname "Pulttiklimi" or "Boltklimi" referring to sub-index E (Ekranyi = Reinforced or with Screens) which meant that the tank had additional 25 mm applique armour riveted onto hull and turret with large bolts. 

Due to mechanical unreliability and lack of spare parts KV-1E was seldom used in combat and was released from the army inventory in 1945. Today KV-1E is a very interesting and rare museum exhibit but as a fighting weapon it belongs to the list of bottom ones.

KV-1E technical data:

Weight: 45 t         

Armour: 30 – 110 mm 

Armament: F-32 cannon 76,2 mm, 2x7,62 MG

Penetration: at 90 angles at 500 m distance 69 mm with standard BR-350A AP round (initial velocity of 662m/sec)

Powerplant: V-2K, 12-cylinder diesel, 600 hp

Speed: 35 km/h    

Range: 225 km

Crew: 5 men; commander, gunner, loader, driver and assistant driver/bow gunner

4 Soviet T-26 light tank 

Early in the 1930's Soviets purchased 15 Vickers 6-ton Model A tanks and manufacturing licences from England. It marked the beginning of a Soviet nine year production run of T-26 tanks with many sub variants. There were twin turreted MG and single turreted cannon tanks, flamethrowers, bridge layers, radio controlled versions, artillery tractors and ammunition carriers as well as fire support tanks with 76 mm regimental guns and even 122 mm howitzers. Soviets produced some 10 000 gun tanks and another 2 000 specialized versions.

 Very rare T-26 Model 1933 at Parola 2026 © Historix

The combat debut for T-26 was the Spanish Civil War. There it first shined, and at the same time Spain became it's swansong. After initial successes in the last part of 1936 the role of T-26 tanks declined. T-26 suffered multiple issues like weak tracks prone to break, poor vision devices which made the crew almost blind, practically nonexistent ventilation inside the turret and troublesome 71-TK-1 radio. But the most alarming feature was the thin armour of max. 15 mm. That had been sufficient when enemy tanks had no cannons. 

Armour penetrated, T-26 at Parola 2026 © Historix

Things changed dramatically at the beginning of 1937 when Germans supplied 3,7 cm PAK 36 anti-tank guns to Nationalist Forces. 

The PAK 36 swept T-26 tanks like MG's the infantry: simply the thin armour of T-26 wasn't able to resist new German gun.

Exit holes, T-26 at Parola 2026 © Historix

Adding the unreliable mechanics of the T-26, Soviets came to conclusion to start design a completely new battle tanks on their own resources. This, after couple of years, lead to the famous KV-1 and T-34/76 series. 

The Spanish Civil War gave the T-26 reputation as the best interwar period tank
and at the same time destroyed it's fame. As the World War Two started the T-26 had already sunken to the category of bottom tanks with all its deadly shortcomings. 

Finns captured numerous T-26s in the Winter and Continuation Wars. Some 100 examples were put in the front line service until mid July 1944, the last ones retiring as conscript trainers early in the 1960's.

T-26 with penetration holes, Winter War booty, at Parola 2026 © Historix

T-26 technical data (in Soviet use):

Weight: 9,4 – 11 t            

Armour: 6 – 15 mm

Armament: 45 mm 20-K cannon, 1 – 2 x 7,62 MG

Penetration at 90 angles at 300 m distance 53 mm

Powerplant: 4-cylinder, 6,4 liter horizontal air-cooled petrol. 90 hp

Speed: 35 km/h        

Range: 340 km

Crew: 3 men; commander/loader, gunner, driver

3 Soviet T-60 M 1941 light tank

                                         ”братская могила на двоих” 

T-60 Light Tank at Parola 2026 © Historix

This is how Soviet tankers named the T-60. In English it says "The Coffin for Two Brothers". The Soviet Union was attacked by Germans in June 1941 and Soviet tank losses had been tremendous. 

Soviet tank factories had been transferred to the Urals and before their output become sufficient to make good amounting losses and Lend-Lease program to take effect, Soviets had make do what they got. That wasn't much and  in the desperation even stopgap T-60 tanks were sent to fight German Panzers. Soviet tankers' losses were predictably horrifying.

T-60 had a 20 mm TNSh-1 automatic cannon as a main weapon. The cannon, actually a modified aircraft gun, couldn't penetrate the frontal armour of German tanks from mid-1941 onward. Though it could deal with lighter vehicles, half-tracks or side/rear shots on early tanks at close range. This limited the tank mostly to infantry support and recce roles. Failed attempts were made to up-gun the T-60 with 37 or 45 mm cannons. These led to the development of better armed T-70. 

T-60 shows the 20 mm cannon at Parola 2026 © Historix

Finns captured one T-60 in the summer of 1944 at Portinhoikka, on the Karelian Isthmus, while fighting a decisive defensive battle by stopping the advancing Soviet elite Guards tank formations dash to the inner part of Finland. T-60 never served with the Finnish army - perhaps it was only better that way. Since the T-60 definitely belongs to the bottom tanks.  

 

T-60 technical data:

Weight: 6,4 t            

Armour: 7 – 35 mm

Armament: 20 mm TNSh automatic cannon, DT MG 7,62 mm

Penetration: at 90 angles at 500 m distance 15 mm

Powerplant: Gaz 202 6-cylinder petrol, 76 hp

Speed: 45 km/h        

Range: 450 km

Crew: 2 men; commander/gunner, driver

2 Finnish BT-42 Assault Gun 

What You expect the outcome to be if You take two obsolete weapon, put them together and hope to get a sound fighting combination? In 1942 Finns tried to get this done. Predictably the outcome was just one more tank straight into the Bottom Tank list.

Just before the start of the Continuation War, June 1941, Finns had a tank core of some 200 tanks, armoured cars or armoured tractors. Most of those were captured from the Soviet Red Army in the Winter War. However, of these Finns could field only some 50 battle worthy tanks. These were the British Vickers 6-ton tanks purchased to Finland before the Winter War (now equipped with captured Soviet 45 mm cannons) and war booty T-26 tanks of various sub-models.

German Panzerwaffe was taken as an example for the Finnish tank core how to improve and develop its structure and tactics. That in mind Finns formed in first half of the 1942 the Panssaridivisioona (Armour Division).  It was done to replace the 1941 Panssaripataljoona (Armour Battalion) by adding new units to the composition of new Armoured Division. The main units of the body being HQ, Jääkäriprikaati (Jäger Brigade) and Panssariprikaati (Armoured Brigade). These were supported by Artillery-, Engineer-, Armoured AA- and Assault Gun Battalions among others and Quartermaster's Corps. 

Now the BT-42 enters the stage: at the time Germans were unwilling to sell modern equipment to Finland, such as assault guns like Stug40. With no other options available, the Finns decided to build their own. In 1942 they took captured Soviet BT-7 tanks - already known to be unreliable and largely unusable - and rebuild them into a Finnish assault gun.

Lets have a look how it materialized. Timo Teräsvalli writes:

"The turrets of BT-7 tanks were renewed, and British howitzers of caliber 114 mm, year-model 1918 were installed. The new turret was large and sighting- and viewing equipment sorrowful."

And what can be said about the BT-7 chassis itself? 

"The vehicle was indeed fast, but constantly suffered from all sorts of technical faults. The tracks often slipped off, and the track/road wheel changing mechanism was a poor concept". 

Not much good it seems. What about the BT-42 in combat, how did it score? There was just one battle in which BT-42s took part. It was quite a significant one as well: to help the 20. Prikaati (20. Brigade) to defend the second largest city of Finland in 1944 - Viipuri, modern day Russian Vyborg in the Karelian Isthmus.

So, how did it go - the battle? Mr. Teräsvalli describes the situation:

"The explosive squash head (HESH) grenades from the old British howitzer had no effect on the Red Army tanks."

In fact one of the BT-42s hit enemy tank 18 times with no results. Respectively the very same enemy tank fired eight rounds back and scored no hits! 

In Viipuri there were 9 BT-42 assault guns taking part to the defensive battle. Five (5) of them were lost during the fight. Other four ones withdrew the battleground. After the Battle of Viipuri all but one were scrapped. Good riddance, I suggest, their crews must have thought. Today the one remaining BT-42 is preserved at the Armour Museum of Parola.

The BT-42 at Parola 2026 © Historix

P.S. the sorrowful career of BT-42s was a result of misunderstood tactical use as an anti-tank weapon. Had it been used as an armoured mobile indirect fire artillery against infantry, it would have been a sound weapon system with its potent HE round.

BT-42 technical data (in Finnish use):

Weight: 15,5 t            

Armour: 6 – 22 mm

Armament: 114 mm H 18 howitzer, velocity of 345m/sec)  

Penetration: HE and HESH round, armour penetraton almost nil

Powerplant: M-17T, V-12 petrol liquid cooled, 450 hp

Speed: on tracks 52 km/h, on wheels 72 km/h       

Range: on tracks 230 km, on wheels 500 km

Crew: 3 men; commander/gunner, loader, driver

1 British Vickers-Carden-Loyd MkVI tankette

Finally the number one on my list. To be precise, it's not really a tank. We better characterize it as a tankette. That is to say a small tracked combat vehicle, usually with only two man crew, lightly armoured just to stop bullets and usually with no rotating turret. Armament consisting only machine guns of various calibers. One might not expect much of a fighting capabilities with this kind of mix. Still in the 1920's-1930's this concept became surprisingly popular. How that came to be?

To find an answer we must look at politicians and money. Tankettes were cheap and easy to produce by great numbers. The numbers and at the same time saving costs seemed to be more important than to produce for the army capable tanks. The concept was born in Great Britain but was widely accepted by various armies around the world. Some nations purchased tankettes, others bought their manufacturing licences.

One of the most notable tankette is the British Vickers-Carden-Loyd MkVI. It was copied by Italy (CV L3/33 - 35), Poland (TK, TKS), Czechoslovakia (Tancik vz. 33), Japan (Type 94) and Soviet Union (T-27). 

Vickers-Carden-Loyd MkVI at Parola 2026 © Historix

Tankettes fought on during the 1930's in Bolivia Chacao War between Bolivia and Paraguay, in Abyssinia (modern day Ethiopia) as Italy invaded and colonized the country, in Spanish Civil War and by Polish Army trying to stop the invading German forces in 1939. Needless to highlight the fact: tankettes were of little combat value. 

MkVI Produced in July 1933 © Historix

That's why they were phased out of service or were relegated to secondary roles after the early stages of the Second World War. With the exception of Italy, whose tankers had to fight on with their tankettes in North Africa 1940-1943. Germans used captured Polish TKS-tankettes as a security vehicles around airfields in Norway. Soviet T-27 was seen in the front lines of the Eastern Front 1941 but soon vanished the scene.

In the early 1930's Finland was seeking for replacement to its ageing and obsolete fleet of Renault FT-17 tanks. That's why an order of four Vickers tanks were made for trials. One of these was MkVI tankette. It had several serious drawbacks: in summer MkVI became unbearable hot for its crew due to engine which lay unprotected between the two crew members. It was armed only with one 7,7 mm MG and the armour protection barely managed to stop rifle bullets. Its cross-country mobility was weak and the engine kept interiors very noisy.

After the trials Finns selected wisely another option for their new service tank. The chosen one was Vickers 6-ton Tank type E.

MkVI has got some style of its own © Historix

And there You have it: my choices for the 5 Bottom Tanks from the collection of The Armour Museum of Parola.

Vickers-Carden-Loyd Mk VI technical data:

Weight: 1,36 t            

Armour: 4 – 9 mm

Armament: 7,7 mm MG

Powerplant: Ford four cylinder petrol, 40 hp

Speed: 45 km/h        

Range: 160 km

Crew: 2 men; commander/gunner, driver

Notes

Soviet KV-1E Heavy Tank

1. Zaloga, Steven J. KV-1 & 2 Heavy Tanks 1939-45. p. 6-11

2. Teräsvalli, Timo. The Parola Armour Museum. p. 32-33

3. Green, Michael. Russian Armour in the Second World War.p. 117-126

Soviet T-26 Light Tank 

1. Teräsvalli, Timo. The Parola Armour Museum. p. 25-27

2. Zaloga, Steven J. T-26 light tank. p. 4-5

3. Green, Michael. Russian Armour in the Second World War.p. 20-25

Soviet T-60 Light Tank

1. Teräsvalli, Timo. The Parola Armour Museum. p. 41

2. Green, Michael. Russian Armour in the Second World War. p. 19, 28-32

3. Kantakoski, Pekka. Panssarimuseo. p.24

4. Grog AI

Finnish BT-42 Assault Gun

1. Teräsvalli, Timo. The Parola Armour Museum. p. 29-31

2. Käkelä, Erkki. Panssaridivisioona 1942-1944. p. 170-175

3. Haapanen, Atso. Suomen Panssariase 1918-1944. p. 81, 96-97, 127

4. Zaloga, Steven J. BT Fast Tank The Red Army's Cavalry Tank 1931-45. p. 44

British Vickers-Carden-Loyd MkVI Tankette

1. Teräsvalli, Timo. The Parola Armour Museum. p. 15-16

2. Kantakoski, Pekka. Panssarimuseo. p. 10-11

3. Grog AI

Puna-armeijan vaununjohtaja tiikerijahdissa

Vasiliy Krysov oli harvinaisen onnekas Puna-armeijan panssarisotilas: hän taisteli Stalingradin, Kurskin ja Kievin kautta sodan loppuun ja jäi henkiin kertomaan kokemuksistaan. Hän aloitti uransa vaunujohtajana KV-1S panssarivaunussa, siirtyi rynnäkkötykkeihin SU-122 ja SU-85 patterinjohtajaksi, kunnes sodan lopussa taisteli T-34/85 vaunulla. Krysovin vaiheet koulutuksesta sodan kautta siviiliin jakautuvat kirjassa 15 lukuun, sitä havainnollistavat useat mainiot taktiset tilannekartat ja pieni kuvaliite. Hyvät viitteet ja hakemisto auttavat ja taustoittavat lukijaa.

Muistelmien teksti pääsee täyteen vauhtiin heti alussa: heinäkuussa 1942 Lipologovon kylän taistelussa lähellä Kalats na Donia Krysovin yksikkö sai Katjusha-rakettien pelästyttämiltä saksalaisilta ehjänä haltuunsa peräti 30 Panzer IV vaunua ja paljon muita panssariajoneuvoja. Jastrebenkan kylän taistelussa marras-joulukuussa 1943 Krysov väittää ampuneensa jopa kahdeksan Tiikeri-vaunua tuleen omalla SU-85 rynnäkkötykillään. Vastapuolella taisteli Waffen-SS:n 1. Panssaridivisioona Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler.  Kirjan edetessä alkaa näkyä sitä vaivaava sisällöllinen ongelma: saksalaiset esitetään niin huonoina taistelijoina, että lukija saattaa alkaa miettiä, miten venäläisille ylipäätään syntyi tappioita? Sen lisäksi Tiikereitä esiintyy kirjan mukaan rintamalla hämmästyttävän runsain mitoin.

Heinäkuussa 1944 kertojan yksikkö hyökkäsi Bug-joen yli sen länsirannalle, naapurimaahan, niin kuin Krysov sitä kuvailee. Näin hän ei kyseenalaista Molotov-Ribbentrop -sopimuksessa vahvistettua laitonta Puolan itärajan siirtoa lännemmäksi. Joen ylityksestä syntyneissä taisteluissa Krysovin patteri, määrävahvuudeltaan viisi SU-85 rynnäkkötykkiä, tuhosi Waffen-SS:n  5. Panssaridivisioona Wikingin panssarivaunuja. Tuhotut vaunut olivat jälleen kerran Tiikereitä. Kirjan mukaan Tiikerit tuhottiin etupanssarit läpäisseillä laukauksilla. Käytettyä ampumaetäisyyttä kirjassa ei mainita. Toisen kerran Krysov johti puolalaisen Stulnon kylän taistelussa kahta SU-85 rynnäkkötykkiä ja niitä tukeneita konepistoolimiehiä. Hän väittää joukkoineen tuhonneensa kokonaisen saksalaisten motorisoidun jalkaväkirykmentin.

Millä nimellä kutsua vastustajaa? Siinä on ollut Krysoville tehtävää kerrakseen. Hän on rintamalla Stalingradista Königsbergiin. Sinä aikana hän kertoo taistelleensa saksalaisia, fritzejä, natseja ja fasisteja vastaan. Kirjassa ei ole ainoatakaan mainintaa siitä, että hän olisi kohdannut Stalingradin taisteluissa italialaisia joukkoja. Donin aroilla loppuvuonna 1942 koetun katastrofin jälkeen italialaiset vedettiin lopullisesti pois itärintamalta. Miksi sitten Krysov mainitsee taistelleensa myös fasisteja vastaan sodan viimeisten vuosien aikana? Fasistithan olivat Italiassa vaikuttaneen vasemmistolaisen poliittisen suuntauksen edustajia. Ja miksi hän yleistää kaikki saksalaiset vastustajansa useassa kohtaa natseiksi? Eikö se ole yhtä kohtuutonta, kuin nimittää kaikkia Puna-armeijassa palvelleita kommunisteiksi tai kaikkia italialaisia 8. Armeijan sotilaita fasisteiksi? Kirjailijan epäloogisuus selittyy Stalinin poliittisella päätöksellä. Neuvostoliiton propagandassa Saksan kansallissosialistisen työväenpuolueen ja Italian fasistisen liikkeen radikaali, kuitenkin bolsevikkien kanssa kilpaileva vasemmistolaisuus oli tärkeätä salata tai ainakin häivyttää mahdollisuuksien mukaan epämääräisten termien taakse. Siksi Krysov kirjassaan surutta niputtaa natsit, fasistit ja saksalaiset tarkoittamaan yhtä ja samaa vihollista: saksalaisia.

Kirjan vahvuus on sen hetkittäisessä rehellisyydessä. Silloin se kertoo karusta rintamasotilaan elämästä ja tulee kuvailleeksi useita Puna-armeijan vastenmielisiä käytäntöjä. Sotaretkivaimot olivat yksi niistä. Komppanianpäälliköistä ylöspäin upseeristolla oli tapana pitää nk. sotaretkivaimoja, eli yksikössä palvelevia naisia rakastajattarinaan. Sotaretkivaimoja kutsuttiin lyhenteellä PPzh. Kyseessä oli venäjän kielen sanaleikki, jolla haettiin koomista yhtäläisyyttä PPSh -konepistoolin nimeen. Teoksesta ilmenee selvästi kuinka ylemmät upseerit kohtelivat alaisiaan huonosti. Heitä kiinnosti pääasiassa vain oma urakehitys, ei niinkään yksikkönsä sotilaiden hyvinvointi - siksi suuristakaan miestappioista ei piitattu kunniamerkkejä tai ylennyksiä haettaessa.

Krysov summaa kirjassaan tuhonneensa lähes kaksikymmentä ja vaurioittaneensa kahtatoista panssarivaunua. Tuhotuista kahdeksan mainitaan olleen Tiikereitä ja yhden Pantteri. Tiikereiden lukumäärä vaikuttaa epäloogiselta ja heikentää kirjan uskottavuutta. Erään kerran Krysov soimaa puolalaisia siviilejä, jotka olivat vandalisoineet ja hajottaneet kaatuneiden puna-armeijalaisten hautamuistomerkkejä. Toisaalta hän väittää saksalaisten siviilien turhan takia pelänneen ja paenneen länteen etenevää Puna-armeijaa, vain fasistien propagandan pettäminä.

Puutteistaan huolimatta Krysovin muistelmat antaa läntiselle lukijalle mahdollisuuden nähdä Puna-armeijan sielunmaisemaan, sen panssarijoukkojen taisteluihin ja varsinkin kertojan värikkääseen tapaan tuoda kaikki tämä esille.

Krysov, Vasiliy: Panzer Destroyer - Memoirs of a Red Army Tank Commander, englanniksi kääntänyt Vladimir Kroupnik, Pen & Sword, Barnsley 2010, 205 sivua.

Krysovin käyttämistä vaunutyypeistä

Neuvostoliitossa 1930-luvulla suunniteltujen tai lisenssillä valmistettujen taisteluvaunujen puutteet olivat tulleet esille viimeistään Talvisodan taisteluissa. Siksi Puna-armeijan pääesikunta oli käynnistänyt laajan modernisointiohjelman, jolla pyrittiin saamaan uusia taisteluvälineitä varsinkin panssarijoukoille ja ilmavoimille.

Modernisointiohjelma toi panssarijoukoille kaksi sen kaipaamaa uutta, hyvin aikaansa edellä olevaa taisteluvaunutyyppiä (KV-1 ja T-34/76). Palvelukseen tulevat vaunut jaettiin uuden taktisen järjestelmän mukaisesti keskiraskaisiin ja raskaisiin vaunuihin.

KV-1S "Klimi"

KV-1S
Wikimedia Commons

Uusista vaunuista rintamalle ehti ensimmäisenä KV-1 eli Klimenti Voroshilov. Leningradin Kirovin tehtaan pääsuunnittelija S Kotin päätyi Espanjan sisällissodan kokemusten pohjalta yksitorniseen, mutta hyvin aseistettuun ja panssaroituun konstruktioon. Uuden vaunun päätehtäväksi määriteltiin jalkaväen tukeminen. Kaksi valmiiksi saatua esisarjan vaunua lähetettiin joulukuussa 1939 Karjalan kannakselle testeihin ja kokeiltavaksi taistelussa. Tulokset olivat hyvin rohkaisevia ja vaunutyyppi päätettiin ottaa heti sarjavalmistukseen. Ensimmäiset KV-1 vaunut olivat ajan mittapuun mukaan raskaasti aseistettuja ja panssaroituja. KV-1:n pääaseena oli 76,2 mm ZiS-5 kanuuna. Panssarointi oli vahvimmillaan 75 mm. Vaunun paino vaihteli 42 - 48 tonnin välillä alamallista riippuen, joten konstruktion ohjauslaitteet ja voimansiirto olivat kovilla.

Kesällä 1941 KV-1 oli suojan ja tulivoiman suhteen ylivoimainen saksalaisten kaikkia vaunuja vastaan. Sen heikkoudeksi havaittiin huono liikkuvuus, tekninen epävarmuus ja huono tähystysoptiikka vaunun sisältä taistelukentälle. KV-1 oli miehistöluukut suljettuna käytännössä sokea. Kehitysmallien myötä vaunun paino ja telapaine olivat nousseet liian korkeiksi liikkuvaan sodankäyntiin. Siksi vuonna 1942 kehitettiin kevennetty ja teknisesti parannettu versio KV-1S, jossa "S" oli lyhenne venäjän kielen sanasta skorostnyi, nopea. Uudessa versiossa suojasta oli tingitty liikkuvuuden parantamiseksi. KV-1S varustettiin uudelleen suunnitellulla tornilla. Merkittävä parannus oli vaunujohtajan lisääminen miehistöön. Näin vaunussa oli johtaja, joka pystyi keskittymään taistelukentän havainnointiin omasta komentotornistaan. Neuvostoliitto otti näin oppia saksalaisten toimivasta panssarimiehistödoktriinista ja -tekniikasta. Huolimatta parantuneesta taistelutehosta, KV-1S vaunuja valmistettiin vuoden aikana vain 1370 kappaletta. Seuraavana vuonna saksalaisten uudet Tiikerit ja Pantterit tekivät kertaheitolla KV-1 vaunuista ja niiden pääaseesta vanhanaikaisia ja niiden seuraajaksi suunniteltiin KV-85 vaunut.

Ensimmäiset valmistuneet KV-1S mallit ehtivät mukaan Stalingradin taisteluihin, joissa Krysovkin sai tulikasteensa.

KV-1S tekniset tiedot:

Paino   42,5 tonnia
Miehistö  5
Moottori   V-2K-s,  nelitahtinen V-12 diesel, nestejäähdytys
Maksimiteho 600 hv / 2000 rpm
Tehopaino 12,9 hv / tonni
Huippunopeus 42 km/h
Toimintamatka 250 km
Telapaine 0,72 kp/cm2
Ohjausjärjestelmä kytkin-jarru
Jousitus sauvajousitus
Vaihteet eteen / taakse  5 / 1
Pääase 76,2 mm ZiS-5 / 41,5 kaliiperia
Panssariammuksen läpäisy 90 asteen iskukulmalla 500 metrin matkalta 92 mm
Panssarointi 82-30 mm
Viestivälineet radio ja vaunupuhelin

T-34/85 "Pitkäputkisotka"

T-34/85
 Foto © Historix

Harkovan veturitehtaalla vuonna 1940 suunniteltu ja valmistettu T-34 nousi Neuvostoliiton panssarivaunuteollisuuden lippulaivaksi. Itse asiassa kaikki Neuvostoliiton kaatumiseensa saakka valmistamat keskiraskaat taisteluvaunutyypit perustuivat T-34:n moottorin ja muun tekniikan jatkokehitelmiin. Ensimmäinen venäläinen taistelupanssarivaunu, jossa ei enää vaikuta T-34:n perintö, on 2010-luvulla suunniteltu T-14 Armata.

T-34/76 -vaunussa yhdistyivät uudet, erittäin modernit ja aikaansa edellä olleet tekniset ratkaisut. Panssaroinnin toteutus oli jotain aivan uutta: vaikka panssarin paksuus oli vain 45 mm, se oli kallistettu 30 asteen kulmaan. Ratkaisu teki panssarilevystä iskuammusta vastaan kolme kertaa vahvempaa kuin oli ollut perinteinen 90 asteen kulmaan asetettu 45 mm:n levy.

Tehokas dieselmoottori yhdistettynä Christie-rakenteen jousitukseen teki vaunusta nopean ja maastokelpoisen. T-34 oli rakenteeltaan yksinkertainen ja kestävä, sen leveät telat auttoivat pääsemään soiden ja hankien yli. Pääaseena T-34/76 -vaunussa käytettiin 76,2 mm F-34 kanuunaa, jonka putken kaliiperipituus oli 41,5.  Vaunua oli vaikea johtaa, koska siinä oli vähäiset ja kehnot tähystysoptiikat. Vaununjohtaja oli samalla myös ampuja.  Mielenkiintoista kyllä, KV-1:n tornissa vaunujohtajana toimi lataaja. Kaikissa vaunuissa ei ollut radiota tai edes vaunupuhelinta. Näin myös osastojen johtaminen oli käytännössä mahdotonta. Aikansa modernein vaunu oli näiltä osin 1930-luvun alussa suunniteltujen edeltäjiensä T-26:n ja BT-7:n tasolla.

Kuten KV-1, myös T-34/76 oli saksalaisille epämieluisa yllätys sen ilmestyttyä kesän 1941 itärintaman taisteluihin. Uudet Puna-armeijan taisteluvaunut aiheuttivat saksalaisille tarpeen kehittää paremmin aseistettuja ja panssaroituja malleja korvaamaan PzKpfw III ja IV. Kesällä 1943 saksalaisten panssarikriisinä tunnettu puute tasaveroisista taisteluvaunuista saatiin korjattua kun Tiikerit ja Pantterit saapuivat suuremmissa määrin itärintamalle. Jo vuotta aikaisemmin rintamalle palveluskäyttöön saatu Pak 40, eli 75 mm pst-tykki ja sen vaunukanuunamuunnos 7,5 cm KwK 40 L/43 laskivat T-34/76-vaunun taisteluarvoa, mutta Pantterin tulo rintamalle teki siitä kerralla vanhentuneen.

Puna-armeija aloitti kiireisen kehitystyön T-34/76:n seuraajan saamiseksi palveluskäyttöön. Ennen paremmin panssaroitua ja aseistettua T-34/85 vaunua, eli suomalaisittain "Pitkäputkisotkaa", rintamajoukoille kehitettiin väliaikaisratkaisuna SU-85 panssarintuhooja.  Se oli T-34:n alustalle rakennettu torniton rynnäkkötykki, johon oli asennettu 85 mm ilmatorjuntatykki M1939 (52-K).

Kun T-34/85 saapui rintamalle keväällä 1944, sen edeltäjää vaivanneet epäkohdat oli pääosin saatu korjattua: uuden panssarin miehistöön oli lisätty vaununjohtaja, jolla oli oma torniluukku tähystyslaitteineen. Kaikissa vaunuissa oli radiot ja vaunupuhelimet. Silti uusi T-34/85 ei täysin poistanut Puna-armeijan tarvetta saada pääase, jossa  olisi riittävä läpäisykyky. Syynä tähän oli 85 mm ZiS-S-53 tykin ja sen ammustarvikkeiden puutteet taistelussa uusia saksalaisia vaunuja vastaan: tykin läpäisy riitti Tiikerin tuhoamiseen vain edullisesta kulmasta, Pantterin etupanssaria peruspanssariammus BR-365 ei pystynyt läpäisemään.  

Ilmeisistä puutteistaan huolimatta T-34/85 pysyi tuotannossa Neuvostoliitossa ja sen satelliittimaissa pitkälle sodan jälkeen. Vaunuun kehitettiin kaksi modernisointiohjelmaa 1960-luvulla. Suurin osa sodanjälkeen tuotetuista vaunuista meni vientiin mm. Kuubaan, eri Afrikan ja Aasian sosialistisille maille ja Lähi-itään. Kun vaunun alusta suunniteltiin uudestaan, syntyi T-44. Vaunun tornin vaihduttua suuremmaksi, siihen saatiin asennettua 100 mm D-10T kanuuna. Näin syntyi uusi taisteluvaunuperhe T-54 ja T-55. Vaunuista tuli eri alamalleineen Neuvostoliiton vientivaltti useiksi vuosikymmeniksi ja maailman tuotetuin panssarivaunumalli. Eri arvioiden mukaan T-54 / T-55 vaunuja on valmistettu 80 – 100 000 kappaletta.

T-34/85 tekniset tiedot:

Paino 32 tonnia
Miehistö 5
Moottori  V-2,  nelitahtinen V-12 diesel, nestejäähdytys
Maksimiteho 500 hv / 1900 rpm
Tehopaino 15,8 hv / tonni
Huippunopeus 55 km/h
Toimintamatka 300 km
Telapaine 0,85 kp/cm2
Ohjausjärjestelmä kytkin-jarru
Jousitus kierrejouset jokaisessa telapyörässä
Vaihteet eteen / taakse ensin 4 / 1, viimeisissä 5 / 1
Pääase 85 mm ZiS-S-53 / 51,5 kaliiperia
Panssariammuksen läpäisy 90 asteen iskukulmalla 500 metrin matkalta 111 mm
Panssarointi 70-22 mm
Viestivälineet radio ja vaunupuhelin

SU-122

SU-122 Kubinkassa
Wikimedia Commons

Neuvostoliiton teollisuus pystyi toisen maailmansodan aikana suunnittelemaan ja valmistamaan monipuolisen valikoiman taisteluvälineitä maan panssarijoukkojen käyttöön. Tästä eräänä osoituksena on T-34:n alustalle kehitetty rynnäkkötykki SU-122. Sen valmistus alkoi syksyllä 1942 ja seuraavan vuoden tammikuussa vaunu saapui rintamajoukoille.

SU-122:n aseistus, 122 mm haupitsi M-30, putken pituus 22,7 kaliiperia, kertoi vaunun käyttötarkoituksesta: sen tehtävä oli tukea panssariyhtymien hyökkäyksiä suoralla ja epäsuoralla tulella.

Krysov mainitsee Kurskin taistelussa SU-122-rynnäkkötykeillä tuhotun Tiikereitä. Haupitsille kehitettiin tehottomaksi osoittautunut panssariläpäisyammus. Sirpaleampumatarvike ei ollut omiaan panssarinläpäisyyn, mutta teoriassa 122 mm ammuksen kineettinen energia on voinut olla riittävä vaurioittamaan Tiikerin tornia tai jopa irrottamaan sen vaunun rungosta.

SU-85

SU-85
Wikimedia Commons

Puna-armeijan panssarijoukot joutuivat odottamaan uuden T-34/85 vaunun saamista palvelukseen vuoden 1944 kevääseen. Jotta sitä ennen pystyttäisiin taistelemaan saksalaisten Kurskissa käyttämiä uusia vaunuja vastaan, oli kehitettävä väliaikaisratkaisu. Koeteltuun T-34:n runkoon asennettiin kiinteään torniin tulevan T-34/85 vaunun alkusarjassa käytettävä 85 mm D-5T kanuuna. Vaunulle annettu tehtävä oli kunnianhimoinen: sen oli määrä taistella saksalaisten Tiikeri ja Pantteri vaunuja vastaan.

SU-85 rynnäkkötykki, tai niin kuin venäläiset sitä kutsuivat Istrebitelj - (panssarin)hävittäjä, osallistui ensimmäisen kerran taisteluun Dneprin ylimenossa syyskuussa 1943. Saatu taistelukokemus osoitti, että vaunun kanuuna ei ollut riittävän vahva taistelemaan määriteltyjä maaleja vastaan.

SU-85:n tuotannosta luovuttiin T-34/85 vaunun massavalmistuksen alettua. Uudeksi rynnäkkötykiksi valittiin 100 mm laivastokanuunalla varustettu SU-100. Sen pääaseen tuotannossa sattuneiden viivästysten johdosta joitakin alkusarjan vaunuja jouduttiin aseistamaan vanhalla 85 mm kanuunalla. Nämä vaunut tunnetaan nimellä SU-85M.

Schäufler, Hans: Panzer Warfare on the Eastern Front

It was easy to feel impatient while waiting to get Schäufler's book and be able to start reading it. The author was himself a veteran of the Fourth Panzer of the once mighty Wehrmacht Panzerwaffe. Some other tank divisions would also be presented. One of the most interesting parts of the book for me was the chapter 5. It covers the story of the 16th Panzer's last months inside the Kessel of Stalingrad told by division's operations officer Oberstleutnant i.G Hubert Menzel.  I handled the same subject when writing about Count von Strachwitz's life and battles alongside the 16th Panzer.  Last but not least the book would offer memoirs from the last battles of West Prussia and in particular of the siege of Danzig.

As a matter of fact the book is a collection of brief memoirs of the frontline veterans from various panzer units. These units are the 4th, 9th, 11th, 16th and 18th Panzers which fought alongside the Army Group Centre or South.  There are altogether 14 chapters in the book, which follows the chronological order of events from the very start of the Operation Barbarossa in 1941 into a capitulation of Germany in May 1945. The book comes with six appendixes showing a Rank Table and Order of Battle for the presented panzer divisions. Sadly, maps in the book a rare and almost useless. Fortunately some exceptions are present! When dealing with battles of Stalingrad and West Prussia the handmade maps are quite fine.  Pictures are highly interesting and their placement is chronologically sound. It's just that the quality of paper used in the book doesn't allow the pictures to be of high quality. Some dismal mistakes have been made in the captions when certain tank identifications have failed to be correct: for instance how on earth one could take PzKpfw IV as PzKpfw III or Russian T-26B as BT-5? Small mistakes, you might add. The point here is that in a book specialising on the tank warfare one expects not have such errors at all. There are lots of  of names of places and people in the book, but no Index, Notes or Bibliography.

As mentioned earlier Schäufler covers the time span of the Eastern Front. That being said I have to add that he misses some six months when hopping from the late autumn of 1943 to the summer of 1944. Anyway, at the opening stages of the Operation Barbarossa Germans faced with the new Russian tanks T-34/76 and KV-1 as an unwelcome and unexpected surprise. Soon German tankers learned the inferiority of their principal fighting vehicle (PzKpfw III) against the new Russian models. This, in fact, caused Germans to loose their fighting spirits and demoralized them. It even produced a major crisis for the troops of the Eastern Front. It may have been the first one of a kind, but certainly, not the last one.

Russians fought the war like any German had never seen: often they defended their land fiercely and persistently, many times until the very end. The way Russians used deception and camouflage (Maskirovka) was efficient and masterly. All this made German Blitzkrieg time tables useless as they had not reached targeted A-A-line (Arkhangelsk - Astrakhan) including Moscow by the autumn 1941. As the autumn thaw (Rasputitsa) halted all movement the worn out Germans could only wait for the winter to make roads once more manoeuvrable. As the winter came it made roads and terrain once more passable. Although the Germans didn't have a clue of what kind of an experience the Russian winter would prove to be. Schäufler and the other veterans recollects the miseries of winter battles of 1941 - 1942 so vividly the reader almost can feel the frost, snow and the lonely vastness of the Russian landscape. Germans about to freeze to death in their summer uniforms had to somehow keep themselves alive and weapons functioning. Besides, the Russians had broke through the German lines in early December 1941 just in front of Moscow and the German Army Group Centre was about to collapse. As a pinnacle of German miseries Schäufler memorizes his last moment escape from the hungry wolf pack hunting him for lunch in the vast desert of snow.

Victories of the next summer of 1942 were later wasted in Stalingrad. New harsh reality for Germans came through the stalemate situation and draw as a result of the battle of Kursk. It was the beginning of a long and hopeless retreat. In Kursk Schäufler, a platoon leader in Panzer-Nachrichten-Abteilung 79 of the 4th Panzer, served in the signals corps. His experiences have little in common with von Strachwitz's ones as a tanker in the first wave of attack. The last section of the book concentrates on the last 11 months of the war in the Eastern Front. The reader is taken to the besieged garrison of Courland and into the West Prussia where the remnants of the Army Group North and Centre are fighting for their life. The story is by now very one-sided: Germans have lost too much men and materiel to stop the Russian red steamroller. The only option for Germans is to try to buy some precious time for civilian refugees to escape Russian revenge through the ports of Danzig, Pillau and Hela. This is why, in the page of 280, Unteroffizier Robert Poensgen, a war correspondent with the 4th Panzer, states laconically: "Danzig had to die so that the hundreds of thousand in the Vistula lowlands could survive. The horrible fate of a German city!". The end is inevitable. When the defenders of Berlin had already capitulated, in the West Prussia fighting goes on while the Kriegmarine does its heroic act of rescuing German refugees and soldiers through the dangerous waters of the Baltic Sea.

One of the finest narratives in the book deals, quite naturally, with the tank warfare.  Reader will see through the eyes of a gunner what happens inside a PzKpfw III as it gets a direct hit and is disabled and lying helpless just in front of the enemy bunker line. Equally interesting is to find out how to wage a tank war when the temperature is -54 C below zero. Even in the brutality of the WW II Eastern Front all isn’t just black or white. A German soldier assists a young Russian mother and her child risking his own life, if caught, in the hands of the German Military Police. Thankful local partisans issue the German with a code word. This lets him get unscratched through the partisan ambushes even far away from the village where he helped the young mother.  A group of English officers are being liberated by the Russians from the POW camp somewhere in the West Prussia. It will not take long for Englishmen to sneak through the frontline back to German side and ask Wehrmacht for protection. Likewise numerous French POWs who had been working for the East or West Prussian farms or estates since 1940 ask Germans a permission to join refuge columns heading west via harbours of Danzig, Pillau and finally Hela.

By the spring of 1945 the Red Army had encircled Danzig. Among the defenders were the remnants

of the Panzer-Regiment 35 of the 4th Panzer. Married men, fathers and the only surviving sons are gathered together to form a 200 men strong detachment. It is named after its leader Hauptmann Küspert and given a marching order to be sent home for refit. They took off from Hela docks with 6000 others on the troop ship Goya on the 16th April 1945.  Less than a day later a Soviet submarine had sunk Goya. Only 250 people on board survived including seven men of the Panzer-Regiment 35. Their leader did not make it.

One Jagdpanther crew in Preussisch-Stargard is in the middle of a fierce defensive fight against an overwhelming and charging Russian tank force. After successfully decimating a company of Soviet tanks, the crew suddenly, to their horror, notices a lonely enemy tank facing their vulnerable side armour. In a muddy terrain it takes time, the crew thinks too much time, to swing the heavy tank destroyer 90 degrees to gain a new firing position. Why isn't the Russian tank shooting at us? The crew looks through the prisms and just can't believe their eyes: the enemy tank is desperately, but in vain, trying to depress its cannon to shoot. The muddy terrain gives and takes. This time the Germans had their day by using the two last AP rounds left in the ammunition racks of their Jagdpanther.

Why it seems so hard to put together a decent study of a tank warfare? What I'm trying to say is that the actual content of a book has not always matched with the given title of it.This has been the case for various books of tank warfare I've read. Author may loose his touch from the given title and start writing  something quite irrelevant, with basically nothing to do with tanks. Another tribe are the ones who exaggerates themselves out of business like Vasiliy Kryzov. It's not over yet, the author may also face the shortage of sources so bad he must find more than enough background information to fill in the gaps within the story. This is what, I believe, happened to Mr. Bagnodas with his biography of the Count von Strachwitz.

Panzer Warfare on the Eastern Front is a work with a variable content. Once it offers a poetry which does not seem to have any possible link to the topic of the book. The very last story of the book takes us to the Baltic Sea struggling with seagoing and elements. However, the book is a credible, verbal and very personal war history on the tactical level. It is no wonder the perspective is from the German side - I mean what would you expect to get when you have a collection of small 4-5 page vignettes of front line Landser's stories. In the cover of the book there is a fine picture of a Tiger I -tank.  Oh no, don't expect to see or read about it any more inside the pages of the book. Too bad, the emphasis is on the foot soldier's experiences all the way along. That being said, the remaining coverage of the actual tank warfare is more than worth of reading.

What happened to the 16th Panzer and how it perished inside the Kessel of Stalingrad probably forms the most notable asset to the scholars and war history enthusiast that the book can offer. Hand made maps of 16th Panzer's last struggles just amplify the feeling. Here it is, this makes the book so hard to judge: it fails to complete its given mission, but at the same time, in few cases, it manages to raise high above the average. What if the title of the book would have been "Warfare on the Eastern Front"? I tell you, I would have given the book straight away five stars.

* * 

В Финляндий криминальное правидельство делают с иммигрантом геноцит для все простой финны.

Господи, помилуй нас!

Bagnodas, Raymond: The Devil's General - The Life of Hyazinth Graf von Strachwitz, "The Panzer Graf" - part 3/3

After the successful third battle of Kharkov, Groẞdeutschland was sent to Poltava for rest and refit. It received new modern self propelled artillery pieces like SdKfz 124 Wespe and SdKfz 165 Hummel to reinforce the artillery regiment. A brand new German tank, PzKpfw V Panther sub model D was sent to its first battle in the ranks of Groẞdeutschland. Panthers formed a panzer regiment with two battalions consisting some 200 tanks. Out of those 188 were ordinary battle tanks whereas 10 command and two recovery tanks (Bergepanthers) which supplemented the fighting force. Although these Panthers were quite an impressive formation, before the start of Operation Citadel no less than 26 tanks were out use due to mechanical problems and design faults. The Tiger Company of Groẞdeutschland grew into a full sized battalion of tree companies totalling 42 tanks. This made GD the only Wehrmacht panzer division to have Tigers and even more: it was stronger and more potent striking force than any other Wehrmacht division. That’s why it’s curious that Germans gave it on the 23rd of June, 1943 a new official name of Panzergrenadierdivision Groẞdeutschland.

Operation Citadel - the impossible way to Obojan

Before the operation would start Strachwitz was more than busy organizing battle drills and trying to merge Tigers and medium PzKpfw IV tanks as a co-operative force. As the operation started the Groẞdeutschland Division would serve under the Fourth Panzer Army commanded by Generaloberst Hoth.  To form the XLVIII Panzer Corps GD had the Third and Eleventh Panzers alongside. Strachwitz’s oldest son was still serving with the 11th Panzer so there would be two Strachwitzs fighting in the Kursk salient.  Fourth Panzer Army was to be the southern pincer to capture and surround the Red Army. It was also the strongest individual German battle formation on the field with nearly 1200 tanks.

Strachwitz doubted from the start the future success of Operation Citadel even the German deployment seemed powerful and unstoppable. He had learned to respect the tactical skills of Russians in a defence mode and in particular the Maskirovka, the camouflage and diversion. This time the Bliztkrieg styled pincer penetrations with rapid advances to the enemy rear areas would not take place.  The terrain would be unfavourable for the tanks and the width of the Panzerkeil, the tank wedge, would be only two kilometres.
 
Since the Operation Citadel is widely covered by numerous narratives, I’m going to have a focus on Strachwitz only. His unit had 360 tanks when the operation started on the 5th of July, 1943. After the first day of battle his tank core consisted of four PzKpfw II, 12 PzKpfw III, 51 PzKpfw IV and tree Tigers. The battle was fierce and the Germans tried all they could, but the well hoped breakthrough didn’t materialize. After three days of fighting Strachwitz still had 11 kilometres to reach Obojan, the divisional objective. At the same time they had nine battle worthy tanks left.

While on an armed reconnaissance mission on the no man's land on the 10th of July, 1943 Strachwitz saw an overpowering Soviet tank formation. This did not stop him to give orders to charge! Accurate German cannon fire blew up Soviet ranks. This, however, did not prevent losses on the German side either. The numerical superiority made the difference here. Soon one of the command tanks was in serious trouble. Strachwitz made a sudden rush with his tank to help the comrade at risk. This led him in a perilous situation between the enemy and German tanks.  In a hectic cannon fire duel, the Panzer Count lacked to notice his position inside the tank. This caused him severe injuries as the breech mechanism of the main gun hit him in the elbow as it reversed after a shot. The battle was over for him; he was evacuated and hospitalized for some time in Breslau.

PzKfpw IV, Strachwitz's workhorse in Kursk at display in the Parola Tank Museum
Foto © Historix

Strachwitz Operations in the Baltics

After his recovery Strachwitz did not return to the Groẞdeutschland Division. One of the principal reasons for this might be the open mistrust between him and the commander of the division General Hörnlein.  The two men didn’t get along too well, Hörnlein being an infantry man he could not understand or appreciate the cavalry way of thinking. For a while Strachwitz was a nominee for the leader of the other Wehrmacht elite division, the Panzer Lehr. In the end he was sent to the Army Group North to be a panzer commander of the entire army group. That, however, didn’t mean a considerable force. There was the Heavy Panzer Battalion 502 (Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 502, sPzAbt. 502) with its 12 remaining Tigers and a collection of various survived tanks.

Strachwitz was given a mission: to destroy three dangerous Soviet bridgeheads on the western banks of the river Narva in East Estonia.  These battles are known as the Strachwitz Operations I, II and III. As usual, Strachwitz carefully studied the enemy positions and rehearsed the oncoming action. The Operation I was launched on the 26th of March, 1944. It soon became a startling success. Russians were completely surprised and beaten. This is also what happened with the Operation II: both bridgeheads were eliminated with existing pontoon bridges across the river. Operation III proved to be a failure. Stiff Soviet resistance in Krivasso was too much for Germans and they had to break off the assault and withdraw. One of the Tiger aces, Otto Carius, in his memoirs “Tigers in the Mud” praised Strachwitz and his skilful leadership.

German war graves on the west bank of river Narva 2012
Foto © Historix

The Red Army launched a great summer offensive on the 22nd of June, 1944. Operation Bagration, as it was called by the Russians, started exactly three years after the German Operation Barbarossa. It was a devastating blow for the Germans: the entire Army Group Centre was destroyed and the Baltic States with the Army Group North were cut off and encircled. The destruction of the Army Group Centre was in fact ever bigger loss of materiel and soldiers for Germans than Stalingrad had been. Now it was time to resume a land connection to the Army Group North by launching a relief attack. Strachwitz with his panzer force joined the effort only to see how an enemy tank brigade of nearly 50 T-34 tanks was blocking the way in Tukums. Showing inventiveness and initiative Strachwitz asked the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, which was sailing nearby in the Baltic Sea, to help his panzers with the salvoes of the cruiser’s heavy 203 mm artillery. The floatplanes of the cruiser acting as fire observers and with Strachwitz’s guidance over the radio the centre of Tukums was blown up with the Soviet tank brigade.  Later Germans counted as many as 48 destroyed T-34s.  Germans had another asset as well, this one came from the sky: Hans-Ulrich Rudel with his Junkers Ju 87G (“Kanonenvogel") tank buster plane flew over the battlefield smashing enemy tanks with his twin 37 mm cannons. The land connection was, however, short lived and soon the Army Group North was again cut off; this time for good.

Junkers Ju 87G Tank Buster with 37 mm twin cannons

German radio intelligence service intercepted radio messages sent by Russians to warn their troops about the “Devils’s General” who was supposed to be nearby. Is there a better proof about the reputation Strachwitz had gained? In November 1944 Strachwitz was on his way with his adjutant in a VW Kübelwagen to attend a military conference at the HQ of the Army Group North. Suddenly in a turn the driver lost the control of the VW with serious consequences: the VW rolled over several times. The driver and the adjutant lost their lives instantly and Strachwitz got severely injured. He was hurriedly evacuated by the Ju-52 transport plane to hospital in Breslau.


Am Ende – The Last Battles 

Neglecting doctors orders and advise, Strachwitz left the hospital with crutches. Car accident had caused him to suffer broken legs and arduous headaches. That did not stop him to report at the HQ of the Army Group North and ask for commission. Finally he got his marching orders: he was to establish and train a new unit in Silesia. Panzerjäger-Brigade Oberschlesien was a unit of a new concept. It was based on a grim reality of war situation just before the collapse of the Third Reich. The unit was a collection of surviving soldiers from the decimated old units with miscellaneous weaponry. The core of the brigade was an infantry regiment with supporting branches, a small artillery detachment and some excellent Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyers.

Despite the chaotic situation and lack of proper logistic support Strachwitz's brigade could defend Silesia and cause havoc among the arrogant and sometimes carefree Soviets by using ambushes. Hans-Ulrich Rudel with his efficient Ju 87Gs assisted him for a while. Successful defence brought Strachwitz yet another promotion to the rank of Lieutenant general on the 30th of January, 1945. His joy must have been shadowed by the news of the death of his youngest son. Young Strachwitz had already lost one leg as a tank lieutenant, but had insisted to join the last battles to defend the area of the Reich. The final days of the war were at hand, so Strachwitz led his troops through the Sudetenland to Bavaria in order to surrender themselves to Americans.

War was over and Strachwitz as a POW in an American interrogation camp for high ranking officers. Conditions and treatment were harsh.  Bagnodas even mentions how Eisenhower had taken away the POW status from the German prisoners of war. They were treated as "disarmed enemies" which meant Germans were not treated according to the Geneva Convention protocols. While in prison camp Strachwitz received a shocking news: his wife had died in an accident with an American lorry. They had been married for 28 years but Americans did not let Strachwitz to attend her funeral. Finally the imprisonment was over and in June 1947 Strachwitz had to start a new life. This was the second time for him to return from imprisonment to Germany which had changed a lot. He was no longer a war hero, highly decorated General and being a nobleman served nothing. Instead he was a homeless and poor ex-prisoner. The family estate in Gross-Stein was gone.

For Strachwitz it was time to get married and accept the invitation of the Government of Syria to work as an advisor to reorganize the Syrian Armed Forces and especially its tank troops. He moved to Damascus in January 1949 to start working but just after six months he was forced to leave the country due to a CIA led coup. In the end he purchased a farmhouse in Bavaria and settled down. He lived a quiet life and organised a refugee foundation for the expelled people of Upper-Silesia. Der Panzer Graf died on the 25th of April, 1968. He was buried in Grabenstatt in a family grave with his first wife. In the funeral there was an honour guard present from the Bundeswehr.

"Be careful, the leader of the enemy forces is the Devil's General von Strachwitz himself. Avoid all contact if possible until the strengthening forces have arrived"

                                                        A Russian radio message intercepted by the Army Group North




It is quite a hard task to evaluate this book. The person in centre of the story did not leave much written sources behind him. Probably this is the reason why in the book there is a lot of background information about the war situation in the Eastern Front and about the units Strachwitz served with. Once in a while the reader loses his sights on Strachwitz in the middle of all this. Further more it is annoying to read the book in a novel format. This makes it tiresome, if not impossible to follow dates and find details. One reason I took the trouble to add into this series of blogs information about tank and gunnery technology was the fact that in the book one finds it very little. It would be fair to expect to see a good amount of technological facts and comparisons as well. 

I'm wondering what has happened as in the book there are some confusions or faults on historical time lines or military terms used improperly. For instance page 220 claims there are battalions in an artillery regiment. What are those T-17 tanks doing in this book on page 248? What exactly happened when on page 221 we are being told about the "attempted murder of Stauffenberg"? Finally, why on earth the short barrelled L/24 cannon was better for the PzKpfw IV than the longer barrelled and newer ones L/43 or L/48 like the page 170 claims? This may seem trivial, but in order to understand what happened and why all details must be correctly presented.  

Operation Citadel is the most widely described section, the hard road of Obojan. As Bagnodas is narrating operations in the Baltic he quotes the memoirs of Otto Carius. The birth of German Tank Forces in the latter part of 1930's is well presented. Notes, bibliography and pictures are fine but maps are rare, although one gets along with them. The lack of index is a disappointment.

With all its shortcomings the book is a valuable item in to a war historical collection. It is a story of a straight officer, nobleman and gentleman, a real patriot and his honourable life and battles. 


* * *



SOURCES:

Carius, Otto (2003) Tigers in the Mud. Mechanicsburg: Stackpoole Books.

Rudel, Hans-Ulrich (2000) Stuka-lentäjä. Helsinki: Koala-kustannus.



Pictures: 
Historix
Wikimedia Commons

Bagnodas, Raymond: The Devil's General - The Life of Hyazinth Graf von Strachwitz, "The Panzer Graf" - part 2/3

Count von Strachwitz had pretty much reasons to be satisfied with the previous year of 1942 as he was treated for his wounds in a hospital in Breslau. He had already gained the Ritterkreuz of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves. His troops had given him an honour name of "Der Panzer Graf", which translates to English as The Panzer Count. After the disaster of Stalingrad, individual units of the 6th Army, which were destroyed inside the Kessel, were recreated. Strachwitz, however, did not join the ranks of reformed 16th Panzer. Instead, he was, after his recovery, sent to the elite Wehrmacht formation - the Großdeutschland Panzergrenadier Division. Strachwitz was to lead its panzer regiment.

The Großdeutschland Panzergrenadier Division had evolved from the Guards Company of the General Staff in Berlin. This Guards Company was founded in 1921 to serve on sentry and parade duties. However, as the war broke out in 1939 it had become a truly battle worthy infantry regiment. To amplify its status as an elite formation, regiment was given some privileges. For instance it had  a special regimental insignia of GD with styled font in the collar tabs. The official regimental insignia was the side profile of the German standard steel helmet M35. The Großdeutschland Division was kept better armed, equipped and resupplied all through the war than any other Wehrmacht division. After the victorious Fall Gelb, or the Case Yellow, the German invasion of France in May - June 1940, Großdeutschland was given in Wehrmacht a rare honour of the right to wear a regimental armband.

Operation Barbarossa led the division near the gates of Moscow, where it fought with the 3rd Panzer (also known as the Bear Division of Berlin) to capture city of Tula. Stiff Soviet resistance and harsh winter mounted heavy casualties. Battalions had lost more than 50 % of their ranks.  It was time for GD to be sent home for reinforcements. In April 1942 GD become a motorized division. It was augmented with another infantry regiment, a panzer battalion of two companies, anti-tank, anti-aircraft and reconnaissance battalions. Equally important was the artillery regiment of three batteries.  All these required, naturally, more signals corps and strengthened supply train. All in all, the reformed GD was very potent and capable fighting unit. Although GD was officially a motorized division, it, with all respects, equalled  normal Wehrmacht panzer division. Summer 1942 meant for GD busy times and hard fighting in Voronezh, Rostov of Don and Rzhev. Division was used as a role of a fire brigade, which was trying to stabilize threatened or collapsing sectors of the front.  This resulted, obviously,  in mounting heavy casualties. GD had to withdraw the front to resupply and rest.

The latest resupply of winter 1943 in fact made the GD to be a full sized panzer division and even more. It received another panzer battalion and, most interestingly, a company of new heavy PzKpfw VI Tiger Ausf H tanks.

A PzKpfw VI Tiger Ausf H with some crewmembers

The famous Tiger had a cannon almost second to none! The 8,8 cm KwK 36 L/56 was powerful and very accurate. It had a penetration power to match all used firing ranges and armour protection until the introduction of Soviet JS-2 heavy tank.  As a basic AT-round Germans used PzGr. 39, which had an astonishing penetrating power of 83 mm at 2000 metres and 100 mm at 1000 metres. This was achieved by the sole physics of kinetic energy: the projectile weighted 10,2 kg and the muzzle velocity was as high as 800 m/s.  The accuracy of the cannon was legendary.  The hit probability in combat circumstances at 2000 meters was still 50 % and at 1000 meters much higher 93 %.  There were also other AT-rounds for the cannon,  for instance especially potent PzGr. 40 with a sub-calibre tungsten core. It scored even better than previous ammunition, but, since tungsten was rare and expensive, and not really needed here, it was not widely used.  One important factor related to the accuracy was the use of electric detonating cap, which enabled smoother firing.

PzGr.39 HL, shaped-charge warhead projectile or HEAT, had fixed penetrating power of 90 mm at all ranges, but it lost dramatically its accuracy as the shooting range got longer: at 1000 meters hitting probability was 63 % and at 2000 meters only dismal 20 %.  The very idea of shaped-charge warhead is interesting, lets have a closer look on how it works. In the HEAT projectile the explosive is packed around an inverted metal cone. On detonation, the cone collapses inwards to form a high velocity liquid-like jet which is capable of penetrating armour. I've seen the effects of HEAT penetration in the front turrets of T-55 and T-72 MBTs. The actual hole in the armour is relatively small, one could not always stick a finger though the hole, but the tanks were destroyed all right. Let's get back to Tiger, shall we? Some enemy tanks were destroyed by simply shooting them with High Explosive or HE-rounds, just another proof of the kinetic power the Tiger's cannon could provide.

The armour protection of a Tiger tank was outstanding and enabled its crew to survive and carry on fighting as Soviet T-34 shells were fired at it. Frontal armour was as thick as 100 mm, this, however, led to other problems such as very heavy weight and poor power to weight ratio. Tiger was like an up scaled PzKpfw IV with a lot of more of everything. This led to a design error: the armour was not sloped, but almost at 90 degree angle.

A direct hit, but no penetration. Tiger fights on...

The Tiger company of the GD was later augmented to full sized battalion and Strachwitz become the leader of Tiger battalion. He did a great job, as usual. Tigers of GD destroyed all together 1034 enemy tanks during the war and had a winning ratio of 16,67. Most of these were scored during the time Strachwitz was on the lead. The Großdeutschland Division was supplied and ready for front line service once again. It received orders to march to Belgorod in Ukraine.


The Third Battle of Kharkov

As GD arrived in Belgorod it was attached to German Army Detachment Lanz (Armee-Abteilung Lanz). With GD in the detachment there was the 168th Infantry Division led by General Lanz. The mission was to help 2nd SS-Panzer Corps commanded by SS-General Paul Hausser to defend and hold firmly Kharkov at any cost. The SS-Panzer Corps was the ultimate best what Germans could deploy on the battlefield: the elite troops of divisions like Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Das Reich and Totenkopf were nothing but battle hardened and ferocious panzergrenadier veterans of many engagements with the enemy.

The Red Army had advanced from the killing grounds of Stalingrad to the outskirts of Kharkov. Yet, Soviets had only one goal in mind, to trust further west and liberate Kharkov. The Third Battle of Kharkov was an outstanding success for Germans, although it was at the same time their last tactical or any major victory at all over the Red Army. By disobeying the direct Führerbefehl from Hitler himself not to leave the city but stay firm, General Hausser evacuated Kharkov and thus saved 2nd SS-Panzer Corps from the fate of the unfortunate 6th Army. Even better was to came, Hausser managed to encircle and annihilate Soviet forces involving the battle in and around the city. With his outstanding victory he was left unpunished by Hitler.

The initial phase of the battle in February was not opening promisingly for the Germans. The practically immobile 168th Infantry was cracking when facing a full Soviet onslaught. The GD managed to stabilize their situation for a moment, but finally the 168th collapsed and started to escape westwards. There was a gap in the front, which was fully exploited by the Soviets. They send 69th Army to push through the gap all the way to Kharkov. Germans had no other choice than to split the Großdeutschland Division into three separate battle groups in order to back up the wobbling 168th Infantry and 2nd SS-Panzer Corps. The strongest of these battle groups was the one named as "Strachwitz".  By this far the battle group was the biggest one Strachwitz had ever commanded. 

The Panzer Graf did not hold on and wait for things to happen. No, he seized the initiative and let his high professionalism, courage and use of innovative, if sometimes unorthodox, methods to lead the way to success. By studying three different examples of his methods one can form a picture of his brilliance. Strachwitz used the long range capabilities of  his Tiger's cannons as well as two individual trickery to cope with overwhelming enemy. In Perekop Strachwitz with his Tiger company saw an incoming large Soviet tank formation far ahead on the steppe. He quickly gave orders to take ambush positions and to wait for command to open fire. Some Tiger crews, in a brink of losing their nerves, watched unsuspicious enemy tank column getting nearer and nearer from the horizon with no authorisation to open fire. Suddenly Strachwitz's voice was heard over the radio: Feuer frei! Nine enemy T-34/76s and one KV-1 tank were left burning on the battlefield with no German losses. Remaining enemy tanks fled the scene.

The war diary of the Großdeutschland's 13th company of the Panzer Regiment stated on the 27th of March 1943 as follows: "Usually the first shot scored a hit at ranges between 600 to 1000 metres. At these ranges panzergranate penetrated the frontal armour with devastating results, destroying also the engine of the tank located in the back of the vehicle."

Tigers on the hunt

It was snowing and roads were slippery for the panzer drivers when Strachwitz's troops took the village of Popov. Soviets tried instantly to recapture Popov by sending in a reinforced tank battalion of 30 T-34/76 tanks.  Strachwitz divided his panzers to two groups: first was to form a defensive line to counter incoming enemy. The second was to make a pincer move and get into the back of the enemy.  The plan worked well and as the second group had Soviet tanks in their crosshairs they fired a salvo. Totally surprised Soviet tankers turned their turrets to six o'clock to face the treat.  It was the moment the first group had waited for: now it was their turn to fire a salvo at the most vulnerable armour of the enemy tanks, their rear plates. The outcome of the battle was evident, 28 tanks out of 30 were destroyed while only two managed to escape.

Even if Strachwitz's Tigers were temporarily out of battle condition, that couldn't stop him. He arranged an ambush by setting up a special decoy team out of couple of PzKpfw IIIs and SdKfz 251 halftracks. These lured pursuiting Soviet tanks to a prearranged position, where German PzKfpw IIIs, IVs and StuG 40s opened fire hitting the side armour of enemy tanks at point blank range. Again the Soviet tanks had no chances of survival.

The Third Battle of Kharkov

The Third Battle of Kharkov took place between the 19th of January and the 15th of March, 1943. For Strachwitz it had been quite a successful one, for his merits he received swords to his ritterkreuz.  It has been estimated that this battle cost the Red Army huge casualties of 154 000 troops (dead and wounded) and some 1000 tanks, not to mention 20 000 dead civilian inhabitants of Kharkov. Losses for Wehrmacht were 11 500 troops but annoyingly Bagnodas doesn't supply us with the exact figures of KIA and WIA proportions or any figures concerning German tank losses. As the Red Army had stretched its supply lines to the extreme, losses were mounting and the spring thaw, the Rasputitsa, was beginning,  the front in Ukraine stabilized. Kharkov was firmly in the German hands. The Großdeutschland Division was once again sent to the rear for rest and refit.


A Conspirator

A growing dissatisfaction had been evolving among the officer core of the Wehrmacht against the way National Socialists were waging the war. Several incidents had been starting to compromise the trust, notably the infamous "Komissarbefehl", the Commissar Order, which dictated all communist commissars to be shot on the spot of their captivity. In the 16th Panzer of General Hube, however, this order was not followed. Many individuals in the Wehrmacht, especially officers who had had some access to the general situation, blamed Hitler and Göring for the disaster of Stalingrad. These were also concerns for Strachwitz as he tried to understand what had happened to him and to the German Army. Sacking the qualified leader of the XIV Panzer Corps, von Wietersheim, by Hitler, only gave Strachwitz a personal motive to start doubting the skills of the Führer himself.

Bagnodas quotes the first published Strachwitz biography (Günther Fraschka: Der Panzergraf: Ein Leben für Deutschland, Rastatt 1962) by giving us an insight what was troubling him at the time. This is the comment Strachwitz gave right after the successful medical evacuation flight from the Kessel of Stalingrad. He said: "The day I abandoned my comrades into a hopeless situation... I firmly decided to invent a way to let loose our military leadership from the power of Hitler and liberate the political life of Germany from its burdens."

Before the battle of Kharkov, early in the 1943, Strachwitz took part in a conspiracy plot to arrest Hitler and put him in trial for war crimes. The plan was called "The Poltava Plot". Strachwitz was to form a small, but loyal panzer unit out of Großdeutschland's panzer regiment to arrest Hitler as  he was to make a front line visit to Poltava. The plot never worked as Hitler changed his plans and instead flew to Manstein's HQ in Zaporozhye.

Interestingly enough, an another member of Großdeutschland Division had a major role in suppressing the von Stauffenberg coup on the 20th of June, 1944 in Berlin. Major Otto Remer, commander of the Infantry Regiment of Großdeutschland took direct orders by the telephone from the Führer himself, out of Wolfschanze in Rastenburg, to crush the conspirators. Hitler and the Third Reich were saved, at least for the moment. In the aftermath of the 20th of June Strachwitz got his name into the files of Gestapo. He was, however, not arrested and no consequences ever fell upon him. It's probable that early, pre 1933, party membership, membership of the SS and the favour of Himmler saved him.




SOURCES:

Anderson, Thomas (2014) Tiger - Raskas Panssarivaunu. Helsinki: Koala-Kustannus.

Guderian, Heinz (1956) Sotilaan Muistelmia. Helsinki: Otava.

Quarrie, Bruce (1989) Encylopaedia of the German Army in the 20th Century. London: Patrick Stephens Limited.


Internet  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/8.8_cm_KwK_36

Pictures Wikimedia Commons