Schäufler, Hans: Panzer Warfare on the Eastern Front

It was easy to feel impatient while waiting to get Schäufler's book and be able to start reading it. The author was himself a veteran of the Fourth Panzer of the once mighty Wehrmacht Panzerwaffe. Some other tank divisions would also be presented. One of the most interesting parts of the book for me was the chapter 5. It covers the story of the 16th Panzer's last months inside the Kessel of Stalingrad told by division's operations officer Oberstleutnant i.G Hubert Menzel.  I handled the same subject when writing about Count von Strachwitz's life and battles alongside the 16th Panzer.  Last but not least the book would offer memoirs from the last battles of West Prussia and in particular of the siege of Danzig.

As a matter of fact the book is a collection of brief memoirs of the frontline veterans from various panzer units. These units are the 4th, 9th, 11th, 16th and 18th Panzers which fought alongside the Army Group Centre or South.  There are altogether 14 chapters in the book, which follows the chronological order of events from the very start of the Operation Barbarossa in 1941 into a capitulation of Germany in May 1945. The book comes with six appendixes showing a Rank Table and Order of Battle for the presented panzer divisions. Sadly, maps in the book a rare and almost useless. Fortunately some exceptions are present! When dealing with battles of Stalingrad and West Prussia the handmade maps are quite fine.  Pictures are highly interesting and their placement is chronologically sound. It's just that the quality of paper used in the book doesn't allow the pictures to be of high quality. Some dismal mistakes have been made in the captions when certain tank identifications have failed to be correct: for instance how on earth one could take PzKpfw IV as PzKpfw III or Russian T-26B as BT-5? Small mistakes, you might add. The point here is that in a book specialising on the tank warfare one expects not have such errors at all. There are lots of  of names of places and people in the book, but no Index, Notes or Bibliography.

As mentioned earlier Schäufler covers the time span of the Eastern Front. That being said I have to add that he misses some six months when hopping from the late autumn of 1943 to the summer of 1944. Anyway, at the opening stages of the Operation Barbarossa Germans faced with the new Russian tanks T-34/76 and KV-1 as an unwelcome and unexpected surprise. Soon German tankers learned the inferiority of their principal fighting vehicle (PzKpfw III) against the new Russian models. This, in fact, caused Germans to loose their fighting spirits and demoralized them. It even produced a major crisis for the troops of the Eastern Front. It may have been the first one of a kind, but certainly, not the last one.

Russians fought the war like any German had never seen: often they defended their land fiercely and persistently, many times until the very end. The way Russians used deception and camouflage (Maskirovka) was efficient and masterly. All this made German Blitzkrieg time tables useless as they had not reached targeted A-A-line (Arkhangelsk - Astrakhan) including Moscow by the autumn 1941. As the autumn thaw (Rasputitsa) halted all movement the worn out Germans could only wait for the winter to make roads once more manoeuvrable. As the winter came it made roads and terrain once more passable. Although the Germans didn't have a clue of what kind of an experience the Russian winter would prove to be. Schäufler and the other veterans recollects the miseries of winter battles of 1941 - 1942 so vividly the reader almost can feel the frost, snow and the lonely vastness of the Russian landscape. Germans about to freeze to death in their summer uniforms had to somehow keep themselves alive and weapons functioning. Besides, the Russians had broke through the German lines in early December 1941 just in front of Moscow and the German Army Group Centre was about to collapse. As a pinnacle of German miseries Schäufler memorizes his last moment escape from the hungry wolf pack hunting him for lunch in the vast desert of snow.

Victories of the next summer of 1942 were later wasted in Stalingrad. New harsh reality for Germans came through the stalemate situation and draw as a result of the battle of Kursk. It was the beginning of a long and hopeless retreat. In Kursk Schäufler, a platoon leader in Panzer-Nachrichten-Abteilung 79 of the 4th Panzer, served in the signals corps. His experiences have little in common with von Strachwitz's ones as a tanker in the first wave of attack. The last section of the book concentrates on the last 11 months of the war in the Eastern Front. The reader is taken to the besieged garrison of Courland and into the West Prussia where the remnants of the Army Group North and Centre are fighting for their life. The story is by now very one-sided: Germans have lost too much men and materiel to stop the Russian red steamroller. The only option for Germans is to try to buy some precious time for civilian refugees to escape Russian revenge through the ports of Danzig, Pillau and Hela. This is why, in the page of 280, Unteroffizier Robert Poensgen, a war correspondent with the 4th Panzer, states laconically: "Danzig had to die so that the hundreds of thousand in the Vistula lowlands could survive. The horrible fate of a German city!". The end is inevitable. When the defenders of Berlin had already capitulated, in the West Prussia fighting goes on while the Kriegmarine does its heroic act of rescuing German refugees and soldiers through the dangerous waters of the Baltic Sea.

One of the finest narratives in the book deals, quite naturally, with the tank warfare.  Reader will see through the eyes of a gunner what happens inside a PzKpfw III as it gets a direct hit and is disabled and lying helpless just in front of the enemy bunker line. Equally interesting is to find out how to wage a tank war when the temperature is -54 C below zero. Even in the brutality of the WW II Eastern Front all isn’t just black or white. A German soldier assists a young Russian mother and her child risking his own life, if caught, in the hands of the German Military Police. Thankful local partisans issue the German with a code word. This lets him get unscratched through the partisan ambushes even far away from the village where he helped the young mother.  A group of English officers are being liberated by the Russians from the POW camp somewhere in the West Prussia. It will not take long for Englishmen to sneak through the frontline back to German side and ask Wehrmacht for protection. Likewise numerous French POWs who had been working for the East or West Prussian farms or estates since 1940 ask Germans a permission to join refuge columns heading west via harbours of Danzig, Pillau and finally Hela.

By the spring of 1945 the Red Army had encircled Danzig. Among the defenders were the remnants

of the Panzer-Regiment 35 of the 4th Panzer. Married men, fathers and the only surviving sons are gathered together to form a 200 men strong detachment. It is named after its leader Hauptmann Küspert and given a marching order to be sent home for refit. They took off from Hela docks with 6000 others on the troop ship Goya on the 16th April 1945.  Less than a day later a Soviet submarine had sunk Goya. Only 250 people on board survived including seven men of the Panzer-Regiment 35. Their leader did not make it.

One Jagdpanther crew in Preussisch-Stargard is in the middle of a fierce defensive fight against an overwhelming and charging Russian tank force. After successfully decimating a company of Soviet tanks, the crew suddenly, to their horror, notices a lonely enemy tank facing their vulnerable side armour. In a muddy terrain it takes time, the crew thinks too much time, to swing the heavy tank destroyer 90 degrees to gain a new firing position. Why isn't the Russian tank shooting at us? The crew looks through the prisms and just can't believe their eyes: the enemy tank is desperately, but in vain, trying to depress its cannon to shoot. The muddy terrain gives and takes. This time the Germans had their day by using the two last AP rounds left in the ammunition racks of their Jagdpanther.

Why it seems so hard to put together a decent study of a tank warfare? What I'm trying to say is that the actual content of a book has not always matched with the given title of it.This has been the case for various books of tank warfare I've read. Author may loose his touch from the given title and start writing  something quite irrelevant, with basically nothing to do with tanks. Another tribe are the ones who exaggerates themselves out of business like Vasiliy Kryzov. It's not over yet, the author may also face the shortage of sources so bad he must find more than enough background information to fill in the gaps within the story. This is what, I believe, happened to Mr. Bagnodas with his biography of the Count von Strachwitz.

Panzer Warfare on the Eastern Front is a work with a variable content. Once it offers a poetry which does not seem to have any possible link to the topic of the book. The very last story of the book takes us to the Baltic Sea struggling with seagoing and elements. However, the book is a credible, verbal and very personal war history on the tactical level. It is no wonder the perspective is from the German side - I mean what would you expect to get when you have a collection of small 4-5 page vignettes of front line Landser's stories. In the cover of the book there is a fine picture of a Tiger I -tank.  Oh no, don't expect to see or read about it any more inside the pages of the book. Too bad, the emphasis is on the foot soldier's experiences all the way along. That being said, the remaining coverage of the actual tank warfare is more than worth of reading.

What happened to the 16th Panzer and how it perished inside the Kessel of Stalingrad probably forms the most notable asset to the scholars and war history enthusiast that the book can offer. Hand made maps of 16th Panzer's last struggles just amplify the feeling. Here it is, this makes the book so hard to judge: it fails to complete its given mission, but at the same time, in few cases, it manages to raise high above the average. What if the title of the book would have been "Warfare on the Eastern Front"? I tell you, I would have given the book straight away five stars.

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В Финляндий криминальное правидельство делают с иммигрантом геноцит для все простой финны.

Господи, помилуй нас!

Bagnodas, Raymond: The Devil's General - The Life of Hyazinth Graf von Strachwitz, "The Panzer Graf" - part 3/3

After the successful third battle of Kharkov, Groẞdeutschland was sent to Poltava for rest and refit. It received new modern self propelled artillery pieces like SdKfz 124 Wespe and SdKfz 165 Hummel to reinforce the artillery regiment. A brand new German tank, PzKpfw V Panther sub model D was sent to its first battle in the ranks of Groẞdeutschland. Panthers formed a panzer regiment with two battalions consisting some 200 tanks. Out of those 188 were ordinary battle tanks whereas 10 command and two recovery tanks (Bergepanthers) which supplemented the fighting force. Although these Panthers were quite an impressive formation, before the start of Operation Citadel no less than 26 tanks were out use due to mechanical problems and design faults. The Tiger Company of Groẞdeutschland grew into a full sized battalion of tree companies totalling 42 tanks. This made GD the only Wehrmacht panzer division to have Tigers and even more: it was stronger and more potent striking force than any other Wehrmacht division. That’s why it’s curious that Germans gave it on the 23rd of June, 1943 a new official name of Panzergrenadierdivision Groẞdeutschland.

Operation Citadel - the impossible way to Obojan

Before the operation would start Strachwitz was more than busy organizing battle drills and trying to merge Tigers and medium PzKpfw IV tanks as a co-operative force. As the operation started the Groẞdeutschland Division would serve under the Fourth Panzer Army commanded by Generaloberst Hoth.  To form the XLVIII Panzer Corps GD had the Third and Eleventh Panzers alongside. Strachwitz’s oldest son was still serving with the 11th Panzer so there would be two Strachwitzs fighting in the Kursk salient.  Fourth Panzer Army was to be the southern pincer to capture and surround the Red Army. It was also the strongest individual German battle formation on the field with nearly 1200 tanks.

Strachwitz doubted from the start the future success of Operation Citadel even the German deployment seemed powerful and unstoppable. He had learned to respect the tactical skills of Russians in a defence mode and in particular the Maskirovka, the camouflage and diversion. This time the Bliztkrieg styled pincer penetrations with rapid advances to the enemy rear areas would not take place.  The terrain would be unfavourable for the tanks and the width of the Panzerkeil, the tank wedge, would be only two kilometres.
 
Since the Operation Citadel is widely covered by numerous narratives, I’m going to have a focus on Strachwitz only. His unit had 360 tanks when the operation started on the 5th of July, 1943. After the first day of battle his tank core consisted of four PzKpfw II, 12 PzKpfw III, 51 PzKpfw IV and tree Tigers. The battle was fierce and the Germans tried all they could, but the well hoped breakthrough didn’t materialize. After three days of fighting Strachwitz still had 11 kilometres to reach Obojan, the divisional objective. At the same time they had nine battle worthy tanks left.

While on an armed reconnaissance mission on the no man's land on the 10th of July, 1943 Strachwitz saw an overpowering Soviet tank formation. This did not stop him to give orders to charge! Accurate German cannon fire blew up Soviet ranks. This, however, did not prevent losses on the German side either. The numerical superiority made the difference here. Soon one of the command tanks was in serious trouble. Strachwitz made a sudden rush with his tank to help the comrade at risk. This led him in a perilous situation between the enemy and German tanks.  In a hectic cannon fire duel, the Panzer Count lacked to notice his position inside the tank. This caused him severe injuries as the breech mechanism of the main gun hit him in the elbow as it reversed after a shot. The battle was over for him; he was evacuated and hospitalized for some time in Breslau.

PzKfpw IV, Strachwitz's workhorse in Kursk at display in the Parola Tank Museum
Foto © Historix

Strachwitz Operations in the Baltics

After his recovery Strachwitz did not return to the Groẞdeutschland Division. One of the principal reasons for this might be the open mistrust between him and the commander of the division General Hörnlein.  The two men didn’t get along too well, Hörnlein being an infantry man he could not understand or appreciate the cavalry way of thinking. For a while Strachwitz was a nominee for the leader of the other Wehrmacht elite division, the Panzer Lehr. In the end he was sent to the Army Group North to be a panzer commander of the entire army group. That, however, didn’t mean a considerable force. There was the Heavy Panzer Battalion 502 (Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 502, sPzAbt. 502) with its 12 remaining Tigers and a collection of various survived tanks.

Strachwitz was given a mission: to destroy three dangerous Soviet bridgeheads on the western banks of the river Narva in East Estonia.  These battles are known as the Strachwitz Operations I, II and III. As usual, Strachwitz carefully studied the enemy positions and rehearsed the oncoming action. The Operation I was launched on the 26th of March, 1944. It soon became a startling success. Russians were completely surprised and beaten. This is also what happened with the Operation II: both bridgeheads were eliminated with existing pontoon bridges across the river. Operation III proved to be a failure. Stiff Soviet resistance in Krivasso was too much for Germans and they had to break off the assault and withdraw. One of the Tiger aces, Otto Carius, in his memoirs “Tigers in the Mud” praised Strachwitz and his skilful leadership.

German war graves on the west bank of river Narva 2012
Foto © Historix

The Red Army launched a great summer offensive on the 22nd of June, 1944. Operation Bagration, as it was called by the Russians, started exactly three years after the German Operation Barbarossa. It was a devastating blow for the Germans: the entire Army Group Centre was destroyed and the Baltic States with the Army Group North were cut off and encircled. The destruction of the Army Group Centre was in fact ever bigger loss of materiel and soldiers for Germans than Stalingrad had been. Now it was time to resume a land connection to the Army Group North by launching a relief attack. Strachwitz with his panzer force joined the effort only to see how an enemy tank brigade of nearly 50 T-34 tanks was blocking the way in Tukums. Showing inventiveness and initiative Strachwitz asked the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, which was sailing nearby in the Baltic Sea, to help his panzers with the salvoes of the cruiser’s heavy 203 mm artillery. The floatplanes of the cruiser acting as fire observers and with Strachwitz’s guidance over the radio the centre of Tukums was blown up with the Soviet tank brigade.  Later Germans counted as many as 48 destroyed T-34s.  Germans had another asset as well, this one came from the sky: Hans-Ulrich Rudel with his Junkers Ju 87G (“Kanonenvogel") tank buster plane flew over the battlefield smashing enemy tanks with his twin 37 mm cannons. The land connection was, however, short lived and soon the Army Group North was again cut off; this time for good.

Junkers Ju 87G Tank Buster with 37 mm twin cannons

German radio intelligence service intercepted radio messages sent by Russians to warn their troops about the “Devils’s General” who was supposed to be nearby. Is there a better proof about the reputation Strachwitz had gained? In November 1944 Strachwitz was on his way with his adjutant in a VW Kübelwagen to attend a military conference at the HQ of the Army Group North. Suddenly in a turn the driver lost the control of the VW with serious consequences: the VW rolled over several times. The driver and the adjutant lost their lives instantly and Strachwitz got severely injured. He was hurriedly evacuated by the Ju-52 transport plane to hospital in Breslau.


Am Ende – The Last Battles 

Neglecting doctors orders and advise, Strachwitz left the hospital with crutches. Car accident had caused him to suffer broken legs and arduous headaches. That did not stop him to report at the HQ of the Army Group North and ask for commission. Finally he got his marching orders: he was to establish and train a new unit in Silesia. Panzerjäger-Brigade Oberschlesien was a unit of a new concept. It was based on a grim reality of war situation just before the collapse of the Third Reich. The unit was a collection of surviving soldiers from the decimated old units with miscellaneous weaponry. The core of the brigade was an infantry regiment with supporting branches, a small artillery detachment and some excellent Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyers.

Despite the chaotic situation and lack of proper logistic support Strachwitz's brigade could defend Silesia and cause havoc among the arrogant and sometimes carefree Soviets by using ambushes. Hans-Ulrich Rudel with his efficient Ju 87Gs assisted him for a while. Successful defence brought Strachwitz yet another promotion to the rank of Lieutenant general on the 30th of January, 1945. His joy must have been shadowed by the news of the death of his youngest son. Young Strachwitz had already lost one leg as a tank lieutenant, but had insisted to join the last battles to defend the area of the Reich. The final days of the war were at hand, so Strachwitz led his troops through the Sudetenland to Bavaria in order to surrender themselves to Americans.

War was over and Strachwitz as a POW in an American interrogation camp for high ranking officers. Conditions and treatment were harsh.  Bagnodas even mentions how Eisenhower had taken away the POW status from the German prisoners of war. They were treated as "disarmed enemies" which meant Germans were not treated according to the Geneva Convention protocols. While in prison camp Strachwitz received a shocking news: his wife had died in an accident with an American lorry. They had been married for 28 years but Americans did not let Strachwitz to attend her funeral. Finally the imprisonment was over and in June 1947 Strachwitz had to start a new life. This was the second time for him to return from imprisonment to Germany which had changed a lot. He was no longer a war hero, highly decorated General and being a nobleman served nothing. Instead he was a homeless and poor ex-prisoner. The family estate in Gross-Stein was gone.

For Strachwitz it was time to get married and accept the invitation of the Government of Syria to work as an advisor to reorganize the Syrian Armed Forces and especially its tank troops. He moved to Damascus in January 1949 to start working but just after six months he was forced to leave the country due to a CIA led coup. In the end he purchased a farmhouse in Bavaria and settled down. He lived a quiet life and organised a refugee foundation for the expelled people of Upper-Silesia. Der Panzer Graf died on the 25th of April, 1968. He was buried in Grabenstatt in a family grave with his first wife. In the funeral there was an honour guard present from the Bundeswehr.

"Be careful, the leader of the enemy forces is the Devil's General von Strachwitz himself. Avoid all contact if possible until the strengthening forces have arrived"

                                                        A Russian radio message intercepted by the Army Group North




It is quite a hard task to evaluate this book. The person in centre of the story did not leave much written sources behind him. Probably this is the reason why in the book there is a lot of background information about the war situation in the Eastern Front and about the units Strachwitz served with. Once in a while the reader loses his sights on Strachwitz in the middle of all this. Further more it is annoying to read the book in a novel format. This makes it tiresome, if not impossible to follow dates and find details. One reason I took the trouble to add into this series of blogs information about tank and gunnery technology was the fact that in the book one finds it very little. It would be fair to expect to see a good amount of technological facts and comparisons as well. 

I'm wondering what has happened as in the book there are some confusions or faults on historical time lines or military terms used improperly. For instance page 220 claims there are battalions in an artillery regiment. What are those T-17 tanks doing in this book on page 248? What exactly happened when on page 221 we are being told about the "attempted murder of Stauffenberg"? Finally, why on earth the short barrelled L/24 cannon was better for the PzKpfw IV than the longer barrelled and newer ones L/43 or L/48 like the page 170 claims? This may seem trivial, but in order to understand what happened and why all details must be correctly presented.  

Operation Citadel is the most widely described section, the hard road of Obojan. As Bagnodas is narrating operations in the Baltic he quotes the memoirs of Otto Carius. The birth of German Tank Forces in the latter part of 1930's is well presented. Notes, bibliography and pictures are fine but maps are rare, although one gets along with them. The lack of index is a disappointment.

With all its shortcomings the book is a valuable item in to a war historical collection. It is a story of a straight officer, nobleman and gentleman, a real patriot and his honourable life and battles. 


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SOURCES:

Carius, Otto (2003) Tigers in the Mud. Mechanicsburg: Stackpoole Books.

Rudel, Hans-Ulrich (2000) Stuka-lentäjä. Helsinki: Koala-kustannus.



Pictures: 
Historix
Wikimedia Commons

Bagnodas, Raymond: The Devil's General - The Life of Hyazinth Graf von Strachwitz, "The Panzer Graf" - part I/3

Panzer vor! Feuer frei - Abschuss! In a nutshell, this is all what this book is about. However, Raymond Bagnodas has taken for himself a bit challenging task to depict the life of Count Hyazinth Strachwitz von Groß-Zauche und Cammienetz.  As we know all war diaries and other documents of the 16th Panzer division were destroyed alongside the division on the banks of Volga. Likewise during the chaotic last year of the WW II no war diaries could be maintained. Things being like this, it is hard to produce a comprehensive and solid biography. Bagnodas tries to evade this by describing general events on the Eastern front and within the current unit where the Panzer Graf is serving. This, in the end, however, leads into a strange composition where the reader occasionally lost his sights on the Panzer Graf.

There are plenty of books about famous German panzer aces, we have read about Michael Wittmann, Otto Carius or Heinz Guderian. This book, even with its flaws, is a valuable account on the life and amazing service career of the Panzer Graf in the Panzerwaffe. His life was unusually eventful, if even dramatic and for sure it took a lot of self-restraint and will power to pull through all the hardships that came along.  One major shortcoming of the book is definitely the low amount or near absence of the study of tank technology and its development alongside the world war. That's why I have augmented the review with some data concerning tank gunnery and ballistics.  

The early days

Hyazinth von Strachwitz was born in Gross Stein of Silesia on July 30th, 1893. His family were rich land owning aristocrats who had the 700 years old tradition of naming their oldest son after the Saint Hyacinthus of 1594. Thus, we may learn, the family was Catholic by the religion. Living in the German Empire it was quite obvious for young Hyazinth to choose military career in the Imperial Kaiser's Army. Furthermore, as it later became evident, he was well suited for the task. He graduated from the prestigious Lichterfelde Cadet Academy only to get a commission in the Garde du Corps cuirassier regiment as a leuntnant. He had made friends in the Lichterfelde, most notable of them was Baron Manfred von Richthofen, the future Red Baron. Another notable graduates before Strachwitz were Heinz Guderian, Erich von Manstein and Hermann Göring.

As the First Wold War broke out, it was  Strachwitz who just couldn't wait to get to the frontline action. This suited more than well his character, which was bold and ready to execute the most unconventional solutions if needed. His career in the Great War was spectacular, if brief.  As a cavalry scout he and his team spread havoc behind the French lines. Despite skill and courage he was caught as a prisoner of war by the French. To make matters worse, he and his men were wearing civilian clothes. Strachwitz was sent to a special camp to wait court marshalling for espionage. After unsuccessful escape attempts his treatment got very harsh and this led his health to deteriorate. In order to avoid his death the French sent him to Geneva to get special medical treatment for septicaemia. Treatment was a success and he got his strengths back. Strachwitz masked himself a lunatic to avoid bitter return to French POW camp. Swiss authorities swallowed the bait and send him to a Swiss mental asylum.  The Great War was over for him.

Germany didn't offer much for Kaiser's soldiers returning home after a war lost. The country was in a chaos: internal power struggle led into red revolutions. Strachwitz joined the Freikops cavalry guard and did fight to suppress reds in Berlin. Versailles peace treaty did set up territorial claims by the Poles and Czechs. In Upper-Silesia Strachwitz joined local Freikorps with his brother in order to protect Groß-Stein and Annaberg areas from the Polish mob. Weimar republic was weak and even more suppressed by the French and Brits not to intervene. After unsuccessful referendum clashes broke out between Freikorps and Polish militia. Multiculturalism led into a war.  Extremely fierce fighting took place around Annaberg hill, where there was a monastery and a hill top dominating the river Oder valley. Other voluntary forces, such as Oberland from Bavaria, came to help local Germans. Combined Freikorps and Oberland forces recaptured Annaberg and defeated Polish militia by the experience gained from the Great War trenches. With Oberland Korps fought some future top brass SS leaders, such as Heinrich Himmler and Sepp Dietrich. Strachwitz was personally very proud of his commitment and performance in the cadres of Upper-Silesian Freikorps and especially of the campaign of the Annaberg for the rest of his life.

Annaberg.

Another World War breaks out

Between the two World Wars Strachwitz concentrated on management of his family estate and farming as a living. He did join in the Reichsheer’s Cavalry Regiment as a reserve officer and the Nazi party. Joining the party was a political statement against communism, Strachwitz did not have any racial agendas to follow. Rebirth of the German Army in 1934, now as the Wehrmacht, introduced Strachwitz with the idea of armoured warfare. He did like what he saw and in no time had his application accepted to join the ranks of the 1st Panzer Division and its 2nd Panzer Regiment. The 1st Panzer became his basic unit with which he soldiered from Poland until the Balkans campaign. This period did not mix him with frontline battles. Strachwitz was more than busy by keeping the tracks of panzers rolling and guns blazing by taking care of the logistic services. His time would come to prove himself as a true armoured warrior, for it was time to prepare the Wehrmacht for the execution of the Operation Barbarossa.

The main goal of the ambitious Operation Barbarossa was to terminate the ability and will of the Soviet Union to wage war against Germany. Just as von Clausewitz had formulated it. In order to achieve all this three huge army groups were established. The main striking capacity of army groups were four panzer groups. These were mechanized or at least motorized formations capable of independent fighting. The 1st Panzer Group, under command of von Kleist, was attached to the Army Group South. The 1st Panzer Group had five panzer and three motorized divisions. This meant they had some 600 Panzer III tanks, which at the time being, were the only battle worthy ones in the German inventory. Bagnodas doesn't analyze which sub-models Germans had in service at time, nor do we know exactly what sub-model of Panzer III was used by Strachwitz. The reader is forced to conclude technical details by combining individual fractions of data out of the text. It has its meanings to know which sub-model was used by the Germans since they confronted two brand new Soviet tank designs which caused them a lot of trouble, namely the KV-1 and T-34/76 tanks. Both of these were better armoured and armed than any German model. In order to fight these Soviet tanks with Panzer III, it certainly made the difference which sub-model was being used.

T-34/76.

In the opening phase of Operation Barbarossa, summer and autumn 1941, Germans had two armament options to use for tank duels:  3,7 cm KwK 35/36 L/45 and 5,0 KwK 38 L/42 cannons. Early Panzer III models, Ausf E and early F, had 3,7 cm cannons which were totally useless against new Soviet designs - no penetration could be achieved at any distances. Panzer crews gave the cannon a nickname "Panzerknocker". Newer sub-models, such as Ausf F, G, H and to a some extent early J, had better performing 5,0 cm cannons. However, German panzer crews made a horrifying discovery: even with their 5,0 cm cannons they could achieve penetration only by shooting extremely and suicidal close distances or by aiming side or rear armour plates.  The best projectile Germans had, PzGr.40 with tungsten core,  had maximum muzzle velocity of 1050 m/s and it had average penetrating performance against rolled homogenous steel armour at 30 degree angle from the vertical as follows: 500 meters 55 millimetres and 100 meters 94 millimetres.  The frontal armour of  the T-34/76 was only 45 millimetres thick, but as it was laid back at 30 degrees angle, it was three times stronger than normal plate at 90 degree angle. This meant German panzers had to get within the range of 500 - 100 meters to ensure penetration.   

 

PzKfpw III Ausf H, this time in the Western Desert.

Next year Panzer III Ausf J late, L and M had even better and longer barrelled 5,0 cm KwK 39 L/60 cannons (muzzle velocity 1180 m/s, penetration at 30 degrees angles 500 m 72 mm and 100 m 130 mm). On the other hand, the Soviets had by that time increased the frontal armour of newer sub-models of T-34/76 from 45 mm up to 70 mm.  So even the new and more powerful cannon for the last tank versus tank models of Panzer III did not solve the basic shortcoming of its design: the lack of penetrating power. Panzer III, with all sub-models, was destined to be inferior to T-34/76 all its service life. This can be used as a statement to underline and emphasize the skills of Strachwitz as he had to fight and made his astonishing combat record with inferior equipment! 

PzKfpw III Ausf J with 5,0 cm KwK 39 L/60. 24. PD, 1942.

 

As the Operation Barbarossa finally started Count Strachwitz was serving in the ranks of 16th Panzer Division which was attached to XIV Panzer Korps. The main objective for the 1st Panzer Group was to cut through Soviet border defences and to advance deep into the Ukraine. At first 16th Panzer, commanded by General Hans Hube,  was kept in reserve. Strachwitz served as a commander of the second panzer battalion of the 16th Panzer's panzer regiment.  Usually battalion commander had a special Befelswagen, or command tank, which did not have a cannon but a machine gun and enforced radio equipment. Battalion commander  would follow up the front panzer company with his command tank. This did not suit Strachwitz.  Oh no, he  did not like the Befelswagen and used normal cannon equipped panzer instead. Besides he wanted to command his battalion by following the front panzer squad. Sometimes he was even in the very front panzer to monitor battlefield. What an extraordinary character he was indeed. In the heat of the battle he was often seen commanding his panzers half way out of the commander's turret. That was extremely dangerous practice, no wonder he was injured 14 times.

The advancing phase of the Operation Barbarossa was often pictured as hi-tech "Blitzkrieg" or lightning war by the German propaganda apparatus. That couldn't be further away from the front line reality in Ukraine. Soviets had concentrated their best troops against Germans namely in Ukraine, presumably to defend huge industrial capacity and vast grain fields of Ukraine. Advancing German troops met with fierce Soviet counter attacks and offensives, rain that virtually made roads pretty much useless and vastness of Ukrainian steppe. In the end of June 1941 there was a huge tank battle near Dubno with 250 German and 720 Soviet tanks. Actually it remained to be the biggest tank battle until 1943 Kursk offensive. Germans trying to encircle Dubno had to switch into defence mode as the Soviet 8th Motorized Corps, with two tank divisions with fearsome T-34/76 tanks, charged against surprised 16th Panzer. It was time for Germans to get encircled.  In fact, it was quite close for the 16th Panzer to get altogether destroyed by the Soviets. Strachwitz as leader of recon detachment had his day! As a former cavalryman he fully understood the meaning of movement and fire. Strachwitz quickly cut through Soviet lines and entered their rear area. There he, with his Panzer III tanks, caused havoc and panic over the surprised enemy.  Soviets started to lose momentum and initiative. Soon they turned their tanks 180 degrees and headed east. Hube and his 16th Panzer were saved. Actually Strachwitz was applying old cavalry lessons he had learned in France at the opening stages of the Great War - only this time he had switched horses to panzers.  

KV-1 model 1941.

  

Der Panzer Graf took part in the great encirclement battle of Kiev as a member of the southern panzer pincer force. Late in the autumn 16th Panzer had to help Waffen-SS Wiking Division in a dire straits near river Mius. The year 1941 ended for 16th Panzer in the carefully prepared winter position at the western banks of river Mius. 

Der Kessel - The Cauldron

Panzer Graf had had a leave in Heimat, or homeland, and as he got back to the 16th Panzer he was promoted to a rank of a Lieutenant Colonel of the reserve. It meant he was officially capable of commanding his panzer regiment if such a need should occur. Another significant development was the introduction of a new sub-model of the Panzer IV tank. The new Panzer IV Ausf F2 or even G was actually an up gunned version of the old basic construction. Former Ausf D or F1 had a short 7,5 KwK 37 L/24 infantry support gun.  It had very low muzzle velocity of 385 m/s and likewise poor armour penetration capability of just 39 mm at 500 m and respectively 41 mm at 100 m at angles of 30 degrees. Old Panzer IV could not fight and survive new Soviet KV-1 and T-34/76 models. On the other hand, by the German panzer doctrine, it was not even meant to fight other tanks - it was the duty of Panzer III. Old Panzer IV had a High Explosive Anti-Tank round, but it was primarily meant for self defence and against pillboxes. 

Old PzKfpw IV Ausf F1 and Ausf F2 with 7,5 cm Kwk 40 L/43.

The new Panzer IV variant gave enormous rise to the firepower with its long barrelled 7,5 KwK 40 L/43 cannon. Its muzzle velocity was  740 m/s and penetration ability was enough to enable it to meet its opponents on equal terms. At 500 m it could penetrate 91 mm and at 1500 m still astonishing 72 mm. This meant that Germans could destroy T-34/76 tanks at all normal combat distances. Some issues still remained: thin and unsloped armour as well as narrow tracks which limited manoeuvrability. And then, of course, the worst problem of all: German armaments industry couldn't meet the ever increasing demand of the fronts for new panzer deliveries.  In May 1942 16th Panzer was reinforced and thus it had 140 operational panzers. Odd enough, some of the panzers were already obsolete and not battle worthy Panzer II models. This was the composition for the 16th Panzer as it headed for its assignment in the Operation Blau, the conquest of rivers Don and Volga. At this stage the city of Stalingrad had no great significance - primary goal was to stop and harass all supply and raw material shipping down the Volga.

Bagnodas does not tell us any information about the model of tank which was used by the Panzer Graf on his way to Volga. Perhaps he already had the new Panzer IV Ausf F2 or G, since some of the described shooting ranges do imply that. During the advance he met with a cunning Soviet "weapon" near the river Oskol: mine dogs running towards trying to get underneath the panzers and detonate explosives carried on their backs. On the open steppe there were few hideouts and it didn't take long for a squad of Panzer IIIs to hunt down dog instructors. 

XIV Panzer Korps fought its way across river Don and was getting closer to Stalingrad. In the 23rd of August troops led by the Panzer Graf reached Gumrak airfield. Surprise was total, Soviets couldn't expect to see Germans so deep in their rear. Little did they know about the character of the Panzer Graf! Airfield was left in flames and smoke as Panzer Graf led his troops to carry on. Some estimates claim Panzer Graf had destroyed with his troops as many as 150 enemy aeroplanes. On a bold swing they pushed themselves through the northern districts of Stalingrad and industrial centre of Rynok all the way to the western banks of the mighty river Volga. Panzer Graf's battle group was the first German unit to reach their goal. The success came with a new danger and risk for the entire 16th Panzer. The division had made a tremendous advance of 80 km in a day, but at the same time motorized infantry divisions (3rd and 60th Mot) had stayed behind the progress. Despite of this 16th Panzer tried to capture the Tractor Factory (STZ) via Spartanovka. The effort was met with stiff Soviet resistance and even a counterattack made by brand new products out of the lines of the STZ,  T-34/76 tanks.

The main forces of the XIV Panzer Korps as well as the whole 6th Army were far behind the 16th Panzer. Situation started to develop threatening for the entire 16th Panzer so Hube had no other alternative than to organize a defensive perimeter and to stay firm. The entire division was encircled, to make matters worse the supply line had broken. For now on division had to rely on air supply by the Luftwaffe. The consumption of ammunition became seriously high and air drops couldn't fill the demand. As the petrol reserve got very low, Hube faced a grim decision to make. If division stays on the Volga, there is a risk of it being eliminated by the Soviets or if division attempts to brake west it will act against the Führerbefehl with all following consequences. For Hans Hube odds were all against. Before he and his subordinates, in a meeting to solve this dilemma, had to reach a decision, one of their own divisions, 3rd Motorized, fought its way through to isolated 16th Panzer. To make the day, 3rd Motorized had alongside a supply column of more than 200 lorries. 16th Panzer managed to accomplish what later was tried to handle by the entire 6th Army.  

The crisis for the 16th Panzer was yet not over by the arrival of the 3rd Motorized. There was still a huge gap of 50 km between the Volga bank and the main forces of the 6th Army. Defensive battles followed each other. Panzer Graf quite against his character was forced to stay on the defensive. Division lost its panzers and tankers ever increasing numbers. Yet not a straight and deceive victory was seen. Wearing street fighting had been going on for months and winter was coming. Then the inevitable happened: Soviets launched their Operation Uranus on November 19th which was to capture almost a hole German army encircled.  

Encirlement of the 6. Army in Stalingrad.

 Paulus, the commander of the 6th Army, sent all available panzer units to deal with the Soviet breakthrough. In a complete confusion German manoeuvres were doomed to failure. For instance the 16th Panzer was cut into two halves by the Soviet tank pincers.  Panzer Graf stayed inside the pocket or the cauldron of Stalingrad - Der Kessel. Sometime after the encirclement the Panzer Graf got seriously injured in one these chaotic battles. He did not want to be evacuated but to stay with his comrades. Eventually it was the order of his divisional commander Hans Hube that forced him to leave Der Kessel by airlift. The 16th Panzer stayed behind and perished with all hands, panzers, war diaries and archives.    

SOURCES:

Culver, Bruce (1988) PzKpfw III in action. Carrollton: Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc.

Kantakoski, Pekka (1998) Punaiset Panssarit. Puna-Armeijan Panssarijoukot 1918-1945. Hämeenlinna: PS-Elso Oy.

Quarrie, Bruce (1989) Encylopaedia of the German Army in the 20th Century. London: Patrick Stephens Limited.

Teräsvalli, Timo (2010) The Parola Armour Museum - Guide Book. Hämeenlinna: Ilves-Paino Oy.

Internet

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5_cm_KwK_38

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5_cm_KwK_39

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7.5_cm_KwK_37

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7.5_cm_KwK_40

Pictures

Wikimedia Commons

Bagnodas, Raymond: Panssarikreivi - Kenraali von Strachwitzin elämä - osa I/3

Panzer vor! Feuer frei - Abschuss! Näin voisi kiteyttää Panssarikreivin historiikin toisessa maailmansodassa. Raymond Bagnodas on ottanut itselleen perin haastavan tehtävän kirjoittaessaan kreivi Hyazinth Strachwitz  von Groß-Zauche und Cammienetzin  elämänkerran. Kirjan alkuperäinen, englanninkielinen nimi on The Devil's General - The Life of Hyazinth Graf von Strachwitz, "The Panzer Graf". Nimi antaa vihjeen myös kirjan suurimmasta heikkoudesta: suurin osa niiden saksalaisyhtymien sotapäiväkirjoista ja arkistoista, joissa von Strachwitz palveli, joko tuhoutui rintamalla tai niitä ei sodan viimeisen vuoden sekasortoisissa olosuhteissa enää muodostunut. Strachwitzin ei myöskään tiedetä pitäneen päiväkirjaa. Kun kirjallisia lähteitä siten on perin niukasti, on kattavan ja sidosteisen elämänkerran kirjoittaminen vaikea tehtävä. Bagnodas paikkaa elämäntarinan aukkoja taustoittamalla sotatapahtumia kattavasti ja esittelemällä Panssarikreivin eri joukko-osastojen vaiheita. Tämä kuitenkin johtaa siihen, että aika ajoin lukija kadottaa yhteyden kirjan päähenkilöön.

Monissa teoksissa on esitelty saksalaisten tunnetuimpien panssariässien vaiheita. Bagnodasin kirja avaa puutteineenkin vähemmän tunnetun, mutta silti vaikuttavan uran tehneen panssarikomentajan taisteluja ja elämää. Näin se lunastaa paikkansa ja on arvokas osa toisen maailmansodan historiankirjoitusta. Tiedossa olevan aineiston perusteella Panssarikreivin elämä oli hyvin mielenkiintoinen, siihen mahtui dramatiikkaa ja se vaati melkoista itsekuria ja tahdonlujuutta.  Koska kirjassa kuvataan panssariteknistä aselajikehitystä niukalti, olen taustoittanut sitä kirjan ulkopuolisista lähteistä.

Alkuvaiheet

Hyazinth von Strachwitz (yleinen lyhenne hänen pitkästä nimestään) syntyi  vauraaseen katoliseen maa-aatelissukuun 1893 Sleesian Groß-Steiniin.  Hänen erikoinen etunimensä juontui suvun perinteestä antaa esikoispojalle nimi vuonna 1594 pyhäksi julistetun dominikaanimunkki Hyacinthuksen mukaan. Koska elettiin Saksan keisarikunnassa, niin aatelisena nuoren Hyazinthin tulevaisuuden ammattina sotilasura oli todennäköisin. Niinpä Sleesian Wahlstattin esikadettikoulun jälkeen Hyazinth, ollessaan 15-vuotias, pyrki ja pääsi opiskelemaan Groß Lichterfelden arvostettuun kadettikouluun. Siellä kadeteista tehtiin upseereja ja herrasmiehiä erittäin kattavan teoreettisen, humanistisen, mutta myös fyysisen koulutuksen avulla. von Strachwitz valmistui luutnantiksi ja liittyi kaartin ratsuväkeen. Ennen häntä samasta kadettikoulusta oli valmistunut mm. Heinz Guderian, Erich von Manstein ja Hermann Göring.

Ensimmäisen maailmansodan puhkeaminen 1914 toi nuorelle luutnantille mahdollisuuden näyttää taitonsa. Hänen eskadroonansa kulki pääjoukon edellä tiedustellen vihollisen liikkeitä. Ennen pitkää hän johti joukkoaan pitkille ja uskaliaille kaukopartioretkille ranskalaisten selustaan. Eräällä näistä retkistä von Strachwitz miehineen jäi ranskalaisten sotavangeiksi. Monien pakoyritysten ja huonon, jopa hengenvaarallisen kohtelun jälkeen von Strachwitz siirrettiin Sveitsiin Genovalaiseen sairaalaan toipumaan verenmyrkytyksestä. Estääkseen palautuksen ranskalaisten vankileirille von Strachwitz esitti mielisairasta niin vakuuttavasti, että hänet lopulta siirrettiin sveitsiläiseen mielisairaalaan. Sota oli hänen osaltaan ohi.

Paluu sodan hävinneeseen Saksaan ei ollut helppo: maa oli poliittisessa ja taloudellisessa kaaoksessa, keisarikunta hajonnut ja Sleesiassa puolalaiset esittivät aluevaatimuksia. Berliinissä von Strachwitz osallistui kommunistien vallankaappausyrityksen kukistamiseen vapaajoukkojen (Freikorps) ratsukaartissa.

Sleesiassa tilanne kärjistyi, kun kansanäänestyksen alueen kohtalosta hävinneet puolalaiset aloittivat kansannousun. Ulkovaltojen painostama ja heikko Weimarin tasavalta ei kyennyt hallitsemaan tilannetta. Ylä-Sleesian saksalaiset muodostivat omia vapaajoukkojaan, joilla puolustivat asuinalueitaan. Monikulttuurisuus ei toiminut, vaan se purkautui väkivallaksi kansanryhmien välille. von Strachwitz osallistui vapaajoukoissa mm. Annabergin luostarikukkulan hallinnasta käytyihin taisteluihin. Muita taisteluun osallistuneita tulevia SS-johtajia olivat mm. Heinrich Himmler ja Sepp Dietrich. Taistelu päättyi lopulta saksalaisten voittoon ja tuleva panssarikreivi muisteli käytyä taistelua loppuikänsä ylpeydellä.

Annaberg.

 

Toisen maailmansodan syttyminen

Ennen toisen maailmansodan syttymistä von Strachwitz hoiti sukunsa tilaa Sleesiassa ja oli Reichsheerin ratsuväkirykmentin reservin upseerina. Hän liittyi natsipuolueeseen 1932. Syynä liittymiseen oli natsipuolueen kommunisminvastaisuus. von Strachwitz ei ollut kiinnostunut puolueen esiin nostamista rotukysymyksistä. Natsien valtaannousu merkitsi Saksan uuden armeijan, Wehrmachtin, rakentamista. von Strachwitz oli 1934 näkemässä uuden, moottoroidun ja panssaroidun aselajin kehittämistä. Hän piti näkemästään ja eipä aikaakaan, kun hän oli jo hakenut ja päässyt upseeriksi 1. panssaridivisioonaan (1.PD). Syyskuussa 1939 von Strachwitz oli 1. PD:n mukana hyökkäämässä Puolaan. Luulenpa, että Annanbergin kokemukset muistuivat hänelle mieleen. Puolan, Ranskan ja Balkanin sotaretkillä von Strachwitz ei osallistunut etulinjan taistelutoimintaan.  Huoltoupseerina hänen vastuullaan oli pitää vaunut liikkeellä ja aseet käyttökunnossa.  "Panssarikreivin" aika koittaisi operaatio Barbarossan käynnistyttyä.

Kunnianhimoisen operaatio Barbarossan tavoitteena oli tuhota Neuvostoliiton kyky käydä sotaa ja näin pakottaa se antautumaan. Aivan von Clausewitzin oppien mukaisesti. Hyökkäykseen osallistui kolme armeijaryhmää. Niiden pääiskuvoimana olivat mekanisoidut tai vähintään motorisoidut panssariryhmät, jotka kykenivät itsenäiseen taisteluun.  Eteläiseen armeijaryhmään kuului von Kleistin komentama 1. panssariryhmä, jossa oli viisi panssari- ja kolme moottoroitua divisioonaa. Panssaridivisiooniin mainitaan kuuluneen yhteensä noin 600 Panzer III vaunua. Bagnodas ei kerro vaunujen alatyyppejä, joten lukijan on itse yritettävä päätellä tekniset yksityiskohdat tekstistä välittyvästä tiedosta. Asialla on merkitystä, sillä saksalaiset kohtasivat taistelukentällä omiaan paremmin panssaroituja ja aseistettuja neuvostoliittolaisia KV-1 ja T-34/76 -vaunuja. Panzer III:n eri alamallien tykin koko ja kaliiperi vaihtelivat vaikuttaen vaunujen taisteluarvoon uusia neuvostovaunuja vastaan.   

T-34/76.

 

Varhaisten Panzer III alamallien (Ausf D ja E) 3,7 cm KwK 35/36  L/45 kanuunalla ei pystytty saamaan läpäisyvaikutusta edes lähietäisyydeltä, vaunumiehistöt kutsuivatkin tykkiä "panssarinkoputtimeksi". Panzer III:n alamallien Ausf F, G, H ja J suuremmalla 5,0 cm KwK 38 L/42 kanuunallakin T-34/76:n etupanssarin läpäisy onnistui vain lähietäisyyksiltä (PzGr.40 lähtönopeus 1050 m/s ja läpäisy 30 asteen kulmalla 500 m matkalta 55 mm, mutta 100 m matkalta 94 mm). T-34/76:n etupanssari oli tosiasiassa vain 45 mm paksu, mutta panssarilevyn kaltevuus oli 30 astetta. Näin se oli iskuammusta vastaan kolme kertaa vahvempi kuin pystysuora levy. Päästäkseen läpäisyyn Panzer III -vaunujen oli ammuttava vaarallisen lyhyiltä matkoilta (500-100 m) tai osuttava kylki- tai takapanssarointiin.

PzKfpw III Ausf H.

 

Panzer III:n viimeinen kanuunamalli oli pitkäputkinen 5,0 cm KwK 39 L/60 (Ausf J, L ja M). Sen lähtönopeus oli käytettäessä wolframiytimellä varustettua panssarikranaattia (PzGr.40) noussut arvoon 1180 m/s,  läpäisy 500 m matkalta 30 asteen kulmassa 72 mm ja 100 m 130 mm. Venäläisten uusien T-34/76:n mallien vahvistetun etupanssarin paksuus oli 70 mm, joten saksalaisten vaunumiesten asema ei juuri helpottunut entisestä. Panzer III oli koko palvelushistoriansa ajan alivoimainen T-34/76:n suojaan ja aseistukseen verrattuna. Tämä korostaa Panssarikreiviksi muuttuvan von Strachwitzin ansioita: hän loi itselleen legendaarisen maineen taistellen voitokkaasti lähtökohtaisesti alivoimaisella kalustolla!

PzKfpw III Ausf J.  24. panssaridivisioona, 1942.

 

Kreivi von Strachwitz osana 16. panssaridivisioonaa (16.PD) hyökkäsivät Etelä-Ukrainaan 1. panssariryhmässä osana kenraali von Wietersheimin komentamaa XIV panssariarmeijakuntaa. Aluksi kenraali Hans Huben komentama 16. PD pidettiin reservissä, mutta pian sekin joutui kuluttaviin taisteluihin. von Strachwitz johti panssaridivisioonan panssarirykmentin toista panssaripataljoonaa. Yleensä sitä johdettiin komentovaunusta kärkikomppanian tasolta tai heti sen takaa. von Strachwitz ositti poikkeuksellisen luonteenlaatunsa johtamalla pataljoonaansa kärkijoukkueen mukana, joskus jopa kärkivaunusta! Hän käytti komentovaununaan normaalia kanuunalla varustettua taisteluvaunua. Muut pataljoonankomentajat käyttivät erillistä komentovaunua, jossa oli valetykki ja vahvistetut radiolaitteet. Taistelussa hänet nähtiin usein tarkkailemassa ympäristöä yläruumis komentotornista ulkona. Näin sai hyvän kuvan taistelukentästä, mutta tapa oli vaarallinen. von Strachwitz haavoittui kaikkiaan 14 kertaa, joten hän ei tuntunut pelkäävän asettaa itseään alttiiksi.

Kesän 1941 sota itärintamalla ei suinkaan ollut sitä saksalaisten propagandan kuvailemaa loistokasta ja tehokasta "salamasotaa".  Varsinkin Ukrainassa, jossa oli Puna-armeijan parhaat joukot, hyökkäysten ja vastahyökkäysten, sateen ja mudan sekä loputtomien arojen kuluttava voima aiheutti saksalaisille huolta ja tappioita. Esimerkiksi Dubnon saarrostustaisteluissa kesä-heinäkuun vaihteessa 1941 Huben 16. PD sai yllättäen kimppuunsa kenraaliluutnantti D.I. Rjabysevin 8. moottoroidun armeijakunnan kahden panssaridivisioonan hyökkäyksen. Neuvostodivisioonilla oli mukana uusia T-34/76 -vaunuja.  Huben divisioona joutui saarretuksi ja oli varassa tuhoutua suunnatonta ylivoimaa vastaan. Tiedusteluosastoa komentanut von Strachwitz oli elementissään: entisenä ratsuväen upseerina hän tiesi tulen ja liikkeen tärkeyden ja merkityksen. Niinpä hän joukkoineen kylvi tuhoa neuvostoliittolaisten selustaan pysyen itse hurjatempoisessa liikkeessä. Itse asiassa hän pääsi toteuttamaan jo ensimmäisessä maailmansodassa omaksumiaan hyökkäysmetodeja - hevoset olivat vain vaihtuneet panssarivaunuihin. Lopulta von Strachwitzin aiheuttama hävitys alkoi vaikuttaa vihollisen panssarikärkiin, ne lopettivat hyökkäyksen saarrettua panssaridivisioonaa vastaan ja alkoivat vetäytyä. 16. PD pelastui tuholta.  

KV-1 vm. 1942.

Dubno oli siihen mennessä sodan suurin panssaritaistelu, sillä siihen osallistui 250 saksalaista ja noin 720 neuvostoliittolaista vaunua. Panssarikreivi osallistui divisioonansa kanssa Kiovan suureen saarrostustaisteluun osana eteläistä saarrostavaa panssarikärkeä. Loppusyksyllä Panssarikreivin divisioona auttoi Waffen-SS Wiking divisioonaa sen raskaissa taisteluissa. Mahtoivatkohan suomalaiset SS-vapaaehtoiset nähdä Panssarikreiviä tositoimissa? Vuoden 1941 taistelut päättyivät Mius-joelle, jonne varustettiin vahvat miinoitusten turvaamat  talviasemat.

Der Kessel - Kattila

Toipumislomalta Saksasta palannut Panssarikreivi ylennettiin reservin everstiluutnantiksi. Se merkitsi, että hän oli tilaisuuden tullen kelpoinen johtamaan panssarirykmenttiään. Toinen merkittävä tapahtuma oli uusien Panzer IV mallien saapuminen rintamalle. Aikaisemmat mallit olivat varustettu lyhyellä 7,5 cm KwK 37 L/24 tykillä. L/24 oli tarkoitettu antamaan jalkaväelle suoraa tulitukea, eikä sen katsottu tarvitsevan kykyä taistella panssarivaunuja vastaan. Saksan panssaridoktriinissa toisia vaunuja vastaan taistelu oli annettu Panzer III vaunujen tehtäväksi. Tykille oli kuitenkin kehitetty onteloammus, mutta sen tarkoitus oli lähinnä toimia itsepuolustuksena vihollisen vaunuja kohdattaessa. Uusi Panzer IV malli oli mitä ilmeisimmin PzKpfw IV Ausf F2, ajoneuvotunnukseltaan SdKfz 161 tai Ausf G, SdKfz 161/1. Joka tapauksessa uuden mallin ratkaiseva vahvuus oli sen lisääntynyt tulivoima. 

Edessä PzKfpw IV Ausf F1 ja takana uusi pitkäputkinen Ausf F2.

Pitkäputkinen 7,5 cm Kwk 40 L/43 oli suuri parannus entiseen ja mahdollisti saksalaisvaunuille tulivoiman suhteen tasavertaisen mahdollisuuden taistella vihollisen vaunuja vastaan. Vanhan L/24 tykin lähtönopeus oli 385 m/s ja läpäisy 30 asteen kulmassa 500 m matkalla 39 mm ja 100 m 41 mm. Uusi L/43 pystyi 740 m/s lähtönopeuteen ja erinomaiseen läpäisyyn: 500 metristä samalla iskukulmalla 91 mm ja vielä 1500 metristä 72 mm. Tämä tarkoitti sitä, että saksalaiset pystyivät nyt kaikilta normaaleilta ampumaetäisyyksiltä saamaan läpäisyn T-34/76:n etupanssariin.  Ongelmaksi jäi Panzer IV:n heikko ja pystysuora panssarointi ja kapeat telaketjut, jotka heikensivät maastoliikkuvuutta. Niin ja se pahin ongelma oli, että Saksan teollisuus ei pystynyt riittävän nopeasti varustamaan rintamajoukkoja tällä uudella, vaatimukset täyttävällä vaunulla. 16. PD sai toukokuussa 1942 vaunutäydennyksen, jonka jälkeen sillä oli 140 toimintakuntoista panssarivaunua, joista osa oli vanhoja ja taistelussa käyttökelvottomia Panzer II vaunuja. Näin varustettuna Panssarikreivin divisioona lähti kesän 1942 Operaatio Siniseen kohti Donia ja Volgaa.

Kirja ei kerro millaisella vaunulla Panssarikreivi lähti hyökkäykseen. Tekstistä voi päätellä käytettyjen ampumamatkojen perusteella hänen olleen varustettu jo uusilla Panzer IV vaunuilla.  Joka tapauksessa hän teki tuttavuutta venäläisten epätavallisen aseen kanssa Oskol-joella. Räjähdyspanoksilla varustetut koirat ilmestyivät arolla tyhjästä ja hakeutuivat vaunujen alle räjäyttäen samalla itsensä. Panzer III joukkue lähettiin metsästykseen ja pian maastosta löytyivätkin koirien ohjaajat.

XIV panssariarmeijakunta taisteli tiensä kohti Don jokea ja sen ylitettyään läheni Stalingradia. Elokuun 23. 1942 Panssarikreivin johtama osasto hyökkäsi Gumrakin lentokentälle. Yllätys oli täydellinen: venäläiset eivät olleet odottaneet saksalaisvoimia näin syvällä omassa selustassaan. Kenttä lentokoneineen tuhoutui tuleen ja savuun. Joidenkin arvioiden mukaan Gumrakissa tuhoitui jopa 150 neuvostokonetta. Panssarikreivi ei jäänyt odottelemaan.  Röyhkeä hyökkäys jatkui kohti Stalingradin pohjoisia kaupunginosia ja läpäistyään Rynokin teollisuusalueen Panssarikreivin vaunut saavuttivat ensimmäisinä saksalaisina Volgan länsirannan.  Tilanne oli samalla muuttunut vaaralliseksi, sillä 16. PD oli edennyt Gumrakista päivässä noin 80 km ja jättänyt taakseen moottoroidut jalkaväkidivisioonansa (3. ja 60. mot). Saksalaiset yrittivät kuitenkin hyökkäystä Spartavonkan kautta Traktoritehtaalle (STZ), mutta yritys kohtasi kovaa vastarintaa ja venäläisten vastahyökkäyksiä. Niissä käytettiin mm. juuri tuotantolinjoilta valmistuneita STZ-tehtaan T-34/76 -vaunuja.

Panssarikreivin yhtymä joutui kokemaan pienoiskoossa ennen muita 6. armeijan sotilaita Stalingradin motin, der Kesselin eli kattilan. Rohkea eteneminen kohti Volgaa oli erottanut 16. PD:n XIV Panssariarmeijakunnan ja 6. armeijan pääjoukoista. Venäläisten saartaman ja siilipuolustukseen asettuneen 16. PD:n huoltoyhteys taakse oli katkennut ja divisioona oli huoltonsa suhteen riippuvainen Luftwaffen kuljetuksista. Ampumatarvikkeiden kulutus oli suurta ja divisioonan komentaja Hube pelkäsi taistelukyvyn hupenevan yhdessä ammusten kanssa.  Kun polttoainetilannekin kävi kriittiseksi, Hube kutsui lähimmät upseerinsa neuvotteluun. He pohtivat samaa kysymystä kuin 6. armeijan komentaja Friedrich Paulus myöhemmin armeijatasolla: pitäisikö joukkojen pelastamiseksi suorittaa läpimurto länteen kohti omia linjoja? Lopulta Huben ei tarvinnut antaa uralleen tuhoisaa vetäytymiskäskyä, sillä panssariarmeijakuntaan kuulunut 3. moottoroitu jalkaväkidivisioona mursi tiensä saarretun 16. PD:n luo. Mukanaan se toi yli 200 kuorma-auton huoltokolonnan. Panssarikreivin divisioonan tapauksessa onnistui taktisella tasolla se, mitä sittemmin yritettiin epäonnisesti toteuttaa koko 6. armeijan mittakaavassa.    

Vaikka Panssarikreivin divisioonan tilanne olikin kohentunut, niin heidän ja 6. armeijan pääjoukon välissä oli edelleen 50 km levyinen aukko. Neuvostojoukot hyökkäsivät 16. PD:n asemia vastaan Lukasenkasta ja Panssarikreivi joutui luonteensa vastaisesti puolustustaisteluun. Jatkuvat taistelut kuluttivat divisioonan vaunukalustoa ja vahvuutta. Lopullista voittoa Stalingradissa ei ollut näköpiirissä. Kuluttavat katutaistelut olivat jatkuneet jo kuukausia ja talvi alkoi. Sitten tapahtui väistämätön: Neuvostojoukot aloittivat 19. marraskuuta Operaatio Uranuksen, jolla he saartoivat lähes koko 6. armeijan Stalingradin mottiin. Armeijan komentaja, Paulus, lähetti kaikki saatavilla olevat panssarijoukot eri divisioonista vastaiskuun läpimurtautuneita venäläisiä vastaan. Kuluneet joukot eivät kaoottisissa olosuhteissa kuitenkaan onnistuneet tehtävässään. Venäläisten panssarikiilat jakoivat 16. panssaridivisioonan kahtia. Panssarikreivi oli motin sisälle jääneessä divisioonan osassa.

Stalingradin saarrostustaistelut.

 

Panssarikreivi haavoittui taistelussa vakavasti, mutta koska 16. PD:n sotapäiväkirjat ovat hävinneet, ajankohtaa ei tiedetä. Sen otaksutaan tapahtuneen maalis-joulukuun vaihteessa, kun 6. Armeija oli jo saarroksissa. Haavoituttuaan Panssarikreivi ei olisi halunnut erota yksiköstään, mutta Huben käskyllä hänet lennätettiin ulos Stalingradin motista kohti Saksaa saamaan hoitoa vammoihinsa. 16. PD jäi Stalingradiin ja tuhoutui siellä viimeiseen mieheen vaunuineen, sotapäiväkirjoineen ja arkistoineen.

LÄHTEET:

Culver, Bruce (1988) PzKpfw III in action. Carrollton: Squadron/Signal Publications, Inc.

Kantakoski, Pekka (1998) Punaiset Panssarit. Puna-Armeijan Panssarijoukot 1918-1945. Hämeenlinna: PS-Elso Oy.

Quarrie, Bruce (1989) Encylopaedia of the German Army in the 20th Century. London: Patrick Stephens Limited.

Teräsvalli, Timo (2010) The Parola Armour Museum - Guide Book. Hämeenlinna: Ilves-Paino Oy.

Internet

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5_cm_KwK_38

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5_cm_KwK_39

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7.5_cm_KwK_37

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/7.5_cm_KwK_40

Kuvat

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